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TREAD ON ME! 
Toni M. Massaro∗ 
“If there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is that no official, 
high or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, reli-
gion, or other matters of opinion or force citizens to confess by word or act their 
faith therein.” 
 
Justice Robert H. Jackson1 
ABSTRACT 
Freedom of speech doctrine is an analytical and theoretical morass.  This is primarily because 
expression is a ubiquitous human activity that government regulates in ways that defy simple 
summary.   
Yet despite the complexity and vast scope of the modern freedom of expression terrain, 
commentators and courts strain to identify unifying, formalistic analytical principles and to 
propose singular theoretical prisms through which to view the terrain.  I argue that this is a wrong 
turn. A better understanding of past and present free speech practice requires thinking that is 
factored, not formulaic; contextual, not trans-contextual; dynamic, not static; tentative, not 
absolutist; plural, not singular or even dichotomous.  In fact, nuance will be increasingly 
important in future First Amendment cases, as new science, new technologies, and socio-political 
developments challenge fundamental assumptions that undergird the doctrine. This is especially 
apparent when one confronts the free speech canard that government cannot compel private 
expression. 
This Article proceeds in two parts. 
Part I describes in broad strokes the current state of doctrinal and theoretical affairs in the free 
speech realm. It offers a topography of the free speech doctrinal terrain and identifies key questions 
that pervade it. This section focuses in particular on the significance of “above-the-line” treatment 
of speech regulations that trigger elevated scrutiny.  This overview shows that the doctrine offers, at 
most, a set of norms and questions that inform judicial analysis rather than a “fixed star” or even 
fixed principles.   
Part II critiques three recent Roberts Court decisions that ignore this doctrinal reality.  The Court 
 
 ∗ Regent’s Professor, Milton O. Riepe Chair in Constitutional Law and Dean Emerita of 
University of Arizona James E. Rogers College of Law.  Thanks go to David Adelman, 
Barbara Allen Babcock, and Genevieve Leavitt for improving the arguments herein, and 
especially to Jane Bambauer and Derek Bambauer, for inspiring and honing many of 
them.  I also am indebted, as always, to my colleagues at the University of Arizona James 
E. Rogers College of Law. The editors, especially Marla Benedek, were terrific and I thank 
them for their insightful feedback throughout the editorial process. 
 1 West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943) (Jackson, J.). 
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has insisted that speaker identity distinctions always trigger elevated scrutiny, that only traditional 
and historical categorical exceptions are constitutional, and that government speech is beyond the 
freedom of speech principles. None of these formalistic statements can be squared with other free 
speech doctrine, significant zones of traditional government regulation, or common sense. They 
also weaken the Court’s ability to balance the conflicting policy concerns that arise in a host of 
speech-sensitive areas—such regulation of data collection, licensed professionals, or other 
commercial actors. 
That the Court’s more rigid approach to free speech is unsustainable is especially apparent if one 
examines the compelled speech cases. Contrary to Justice Robert Jackson’s rhetorically arresting “no 
fixed star” celebration of individual freedom from compulsory pledges of allegiance, government 
often demands private expression, crafts it, or silences it altogether.  Government can, and often 
does, “tread on me.” Constitutionally mandated oaths of office, occupation-specific codes of 
conduct, public accommodations laws, audience and context-specific regulation of the content of 
information disclosures, many employment and civil rights statutes, student conduct codes, 
conditions on government benefits, anti-fraud laws, and many other forms of government speech 
regulation demonstrate that there is no across-the-board constitutional mandate against 
government compelled expression. In all of these cases, context, history and a host of relevant 
government interests matter. 
 In 2013, the Roberts Court struck down a condition on a government grant that it deemed 
unduly coercive of grantees’ freedom of expression.  Yet the Court also recognized that contextual 
flexibility matters in determining when funding conditions go beyond sensible restrictions and 
become unlawful compulsion. I praise this recent turn away from free speech formalism, and 
suggest this not only is the better analytical approach in compelled speech cases, but in free speech 
cases more generally. 
INTRODUCTION 
The basic tenets of modern free speech doctrine are as follows:  
content-based government regulation of expression triggers exacting 
scrutiny and is presumptively unconstitutional.  Prior restraints are a 
worst case scenario.  Content-neutral regulations trigger intermediate 
scrutiny.  Expressive conduct walks an uneasy line between speech 
and non-speech, but even government regulations aimed at the con-
duct component of expressive behavior may trigger intermediate 
scrutiny. 
Enormously significant caveats to the basic rules nearly swallow 
these tenets.2  Categorical exceptions, such as “fighting words,” carve 
impressive holes into the free speech edifice.  Most government space 
is “non-public,” and private speech may be heavily restricted or 
banned altogether there.  Perhaps most importantly, government has 
vast authority to use its financial resources and bully pulpit to craft 
messages that serve content-, or even viewpoint-specific, ends. 
 
 2 Cf. Karl L. Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and the Rules or Canons About 
How Statutes Are to Be Construed, 3 VAND. L. REV. 395, 399 (1950) (outlining his famous at-
tack on the canons of statutory construction on the ground that even the most important 
canons have competing canons that have an opposite effect). 
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Assessments of speech “harms” and “burdens” also vary contextu-
ally in ways that may limit speech freedoms.  Acceptance of a gov-
ernment benefit or entry into a regulated profession often means 
that one’s expression can be very restricted, notwithstanding more 
general claims that government cannot compel our allegiance or im-
pose orthodoxies. 
Even more fundamentally,3 the scope of protected expression is 
not as wide as the logic of the basic doctrine suggests.  Extensive gov-
ernment content-based regulation of indisputably expressive materi-
al—for example, computer codes, financial statements, medical rec-
ords, price agreements, trademarks, even web page content—often 
escapes meaningful First Amendment review altogether, or is placed 
beyond serious scrutiny through characterization as “conduct,” 
“property,” or “evidence.”4 
Efforts to reconcile these doctrinal results, or to offer one, unify-
ing theoretical framework for First Amendment problems, fail.  They 
are stymied by the sprawl of First Amendment coverage, the changing 
variables and policies that influence the free speech balance across 
contexts, the common law resistance to abandonment of precedent, 
and the internal cacophony that all of this produces.  A better under-
standing of free speech practice requires thinking that is factored, 
not formulaic; contextual, not trans-contextual; dynamic, not static; 
tentative, not absolutist; plural, not singular. 
This Article demonstrates these points in two steps. 
Part I describes in broad strokes the current state of doctrinal and 
theoretical affairs in the free speech realm.  It focuses in particular 
on the significance of “above-the-line” treatment of speech regula-
tions that trigger elevated scrutiny.  This overview shows that the doc-
trine offers, at most, a set of norms and questions that inform the ju-
dicial analysis rather than a “fixed star” or fixed principles. 
Part II critiques three recent Roberts Court interventions that ig-
nore this doctrinal reality in worrisome ways.  The Court has suggest-
ed that speaker identity distinctions should always trigger elevated 
 
 3 Frederick Schauer, The Boundaries of the First Amendment:  A Preliminary Exploration of Consti-
tutional Salience, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1765 (2004) (discussing the scope of the coverage is-
sue and its importance to First Amendment theory). 
 4 Id. at 1769 (“It is not that the speech [or anything else] is not protected [by the First 
Amendment].  Rather, the entire event . . . does not present a First Amendment issue at 
all, and the government’s action is consequently measured against no First Amendment 
standard whatsoever.  The First Amendment just does not show up.”). 
   I disagree with the statement that the event does not present a First Amendment is-
sue at all, but agree that meaningful judicial review rarely occurs.  See infra text accompa-
nying notes 43–46. 
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scrutiny, that only traditional and historical categorical exceptions 
are constitutional, and that government speech is wholly beyond the 
traditional freedom of speech principles.  Yet none of these formalis-
tic, absolutist statements can be squared with other free speech doc-
trines, significant zones of traditional government regulation, or even 
common sense. They also weaken the Court’s ability to balance the 
conflicting policy concerns that arise in a host of speech-sensitive are-
as such as regulation of data collection, licensed professionals, or 
other commercial actors. 
The Court’s compelled speech cases offer especially vivid evidence 
that doctrinal nuance is essential, and that the Court’s more rigid ap-
proach to free speech is unsustainable.  Contrary to Justice Robert 
Jackson’s rhetorically arresting “no fixed star” celebration of individ-
ual freedom from compulsory pledges of allegiance,5 government of-
ten demands private expression, crafts it, or silences it altogether.  
Constitutionally mandated oaths of office, occupation-specific codes 
of conduct, audience and context-specific regulation of the content 
of information disclosures, many employment and civil rights stat-
utes, student conduct codes, conditions on government benefits, anti-
fraud laws, and many other forms of government speech regulation 
demonstrate that there is no across-the-board constitutional mandate 
against government-compelled expression. 
Indeed, government-compelled expression or silence may often 
be sensible and warranted.  Much existing and emerging science dis-
plays many ways in which human beings suffer from systematic cogni-
tive weaknesses that have direct implications for debates about gov-
ernment-imposed, speech-sensitive interventions aimed at correcting 
for those deficiencies.6  Silence about “bad science” may advance col-
lective interests in expert disciplinary knowledge.  Enforced disclo-
sure of identity, of risks of products, or of a commercial actor’s au-
thorized exemption from general anti-discrimination laws may be 
warranted in some contexts, on public information or other legiti-
mate grounds.  At a minimum, uncertainty about the relative costs 
and benefits of mandatory expression or silence may warrant greater 
deference to government interventions than judicial strict scrutiny al-
lows. 
Perhaps anticipating this objection, the Court in 2013 addressed 
compelled speech doctrine in a refreshingly restrained and non-
 
 5 See Barnette, 319 U.S. at 642.  The approach I favor herein draws from the enduringly in-
sightful account of constitutional interpretation outlined in BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE 
NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS (1921). 
 6 See infra text accompanying notes 232–41. 
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formalistic fashion.7  I argue that this recent turn in the Court’s First 
Amendment approach is the right one and should be followed more 
generally in future cases.  I also offer two examples drawn from re-
cent First Amendment scholarship that illustrate nicely how non-
formalistic analysis might assist in thinking about thorny free speech 
issues that arise when government seeks to regulate data production, 
data dissemination, and expert disciplinary knowledge. 
I.  THE LAY OF THE LAND 
That the free speech terrain is rugged is hardly news to anyone 
who considers the vast zone of human activity potentially covered by 
the phrase “freedom of speech.”  As Fred Schauer observed nearly a 
decade ago, to imagine “that the boundaries of the First Amendment 
are delineated by the ordinary language meaning of the word 
‘speech’ is simply implausible.”8  If the First Amendment boundaries 
were construed to reach all speech, it would require quite a radical re-
vision of common law principles of tort law, contract law, criminal 
law, property law, and much well-accepted statutory law.  The impli-
cations for judicial case load alone counsel against such a reading of 
the First Amendment. 
Yet we already are living with a greatly expanded First Amend-
ment, if not one that extends to the farthest limits of the elastic 
phrase “freedom of speech.”  Freedom of speech’s march to new ter-
ritories began in earnest after 1925, when it was officially deemed to 
be a right incorporated into the Due Process Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment.9  The pace of the march accelerated dramatically 
post-1960, when the Court added calls to criminal action that fall 
short of incitement,10 vulgarity,11 commercial speech,12 and defamato-
ry expression,13 to the higher tier First Amendment fold.  More re-
cently, the Court has given “strict scrutiny” level protection to corpo-
rate campaign expenditures,14 hate speech,15 lies about one’s military 
 
 7 Agency for Int’l Dev. v. Alliance for Open Soc’y Int’l, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2321 (2013) (hold-
ing unconstitutional § 7631(f) of the United States Leadership Against HIV/AIDS, Tu-
berculosis, and Malaria Act of 2003, which required that organizations accepting federal 
funds to combat these diseases abroad maintain policies explicitly opposing prostitution). 
 8 Schauer, supra note 3, at 1773. 
 9 Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925). 
 10 Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969). 
 11 Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 25 (1971). 
 12 Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748 
(1976). 
 13 New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). 
 14 Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310 (2010). 
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honors,16 videos of animal cruelty,17 and violent videos sold to mi-
nors.18  The clear thrust of the modern case law thus has been toward 
expanding freedom of speech protection, even in areas of traditional 
state and federal regulatory control, notwithstanding the Court’s 
claim that original understandings define free speech limits.19 
The broader the First Amendment reach becomes, the harder it is 
to explain why other regulatory zones remain off limits.  Likewise, if 
some speech remains subject to significant regulation then it be-
comes more difficult to explain why speech that may pose similar 
harms is better insulated from government regulation.  Why does 
regulation of commercial speech, but not restriction of data mining, 
now excite serious freedom of speech concern?  Why is commercial 
speech not protected when it is false or misleading, while false or mis-
leading claims made by political candidates get a wide First Amend-
ment berth?  Why is speech that recklessly impugns a person’s busi-
ness reputation punishable, but not speech that viciously attacks a 
person based on his or her race, ethnicity, gender, sexual orientation, 
or other core-identity traits?  The perceived harms of business or 
commercial speech, speech transmitted via new technologies, speech 
aimed at minors, or other forms of speech make strict scrutiny in 
many zones unpalatable.  In still other areas, the nature of the ex-
pressive activity—such as the production of disciplinary standards of 
expert knowledge—makes government content-specific regulation of 
the expression arguably more beneficial than dangerous.  Yet there is 
no authoritative or noncontroversial hierarchy of harms that enables courts to 
confidently place one regulatory zone beyond the reach of the ever-expanding 
freedom of speech grasp, especially if one invokes the most sweeping pro-speech 
rhetoric and logic in many modern cases. 
The result is extremely messy free speech doctrine—both “above-
the-line,” where the basic speech rules currently do apply, and “be-
low-the-line,” where much expression still escapes elevated scrutiny 
and receives rational basis review, at the most. 
This messiness is not likely to change or be solved by more free 
speech formalism or absolutism, though the Roberts Court seems in-
tent upon introducing more of both. 
 
 15 R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992). 
 16 United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537 (2012). 
 17 United States v. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. 1577 (2010). 
 18 Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729 (2011). 
 19 See Stevens, 130 S. Ct. at 1586 (holding that a federal statute criminalizing the depiction of 
animal cruelty for commercial purposes violated the First Amendment). 
Nov. 2014] TREAD ON ME! 371 
 
One reason the messiness will endure is that we are so ambivalent 
about freedom of speech.  We are unwilling to reject the modern 
boundary-crashing that has led to protection of sexually explicit ex-
pression, artistic expression, blasphemous speech, vulgarity, danger-
ous political speech, and deeply offensive speech.  We also are unwill-
ing to accept unfettered government power to condition its grants on 
private grantees’ agreement to sing to the government’s tune.  Final-
ly, once a new zone gains free speech protection, we are loath to re-
move it.  We love our First Amendment rhetoric and many of its re-
sults, despite the analytical chaos they produce. 
But we also reject free speech without meaningful limits.  Context-
sensitive historical, aesthetic, political, and other practical obstacles 
cause courts to tread softly when they apply the First Amendment to 
historically unprotected territory.  Government regulations of speech 
may make us safer20 and less likely to be deceived or seduced into 
making bad economic or political decisions while also making us 
more participatory, more democratic, better insulated from invasions 
of our privacy, less subject to hostile verbal environments, better 
served by licensed professionals, or more egalitarian.  New and ad-
venturous applications of the First Amendment therefore often gen-
erate caveats, nuances, and doctrinal complexities.  These caveats 
create doctrinal riffs that make for further doctrinal chaos. 
The more accurate statement thus is that we love our expanded 
First Amendment freedoms, except when we hate their costs.  New 
technologies have intensified both of these emotions, sometimes in 
the same person.  YouTube is great!  YouTube is disgusting! 
In this Part, I begin with the basic doctrinal topography.  The 
overview is critical to appreciating the complexities of doctrinal anal-
ysis and to remembering the structure we actually have, before locat-
ing current controversies within that structure. 
I then discuss three Roberts Court renovations of the basic free 
speech doctrine that blink at this doctrinal reality.21  In each, the 
Court exalts absolutism over pragmatism, and gauzy free speech 
flourishes over more detailed and transparent consideration of the 
multiple vectors that converge in many free speech scenarios.22  The 
three examples are as follows:  (1) the insistence in Citizens United v. 
 
 20 See, e.g., Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. 2705 (2010) (justifying expressive 
burdens on national security grounds). 
 21 See infra text accompanying notes 104–52. 
 22 Some of these lines call to mind Ring Lardner’s terrific line, “Shut up he explained.”  
RING W. LARDNER, JR., THE YOUNG IMMIGRUNTS 78 (1920). 
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FEC23 and Sorrell v. IMS Health, Inc.,24 that  speaker-sensitive speech 
regulations must trigger strict scrutiny; (2) the rule announced in 
United States v. Stevens25 that no “new” categorical exceptions to this 
rule can be developed; and (3) the statement in Pleasant Grove v. 
Summum26 that “government speech” lies beyond the scope of free 
speech protection. 
Finally, I discuss the theoretical struts to freedom of speech doc-
trine and explain why we need theories, not one theory, to fully cap-
ture the normative features of our current free speech practice.  Tak-
en together, the doctrinal and theoretical insights display that 
modern free speech constitutional analysis is best understood as a 
pragmatic exercise undertaken by courts embedded in a common law 
tradition.27 
A.  Doctrinal Topography 
California recently adopted legislation that bans the use of thera-
pies by mental health professionals designed to change minors’ sexu-
al orientations, including efforts to “change behaviors or gender ex-
pressions, or to eliminate or reduce sexual or romantic attractions or 
feelings toward individuals of the same sex.”28  Is this state law a viola-
tion of mental health professionals’ free speech, as a form of “com-
pelled silence?”  If so, does similar reasoning apply to government 
regulations that require silence about abortion options by federal 
grant recipients,29 or that prevent doctors from recommending “off-
label” uses of drugs?30 
The State of South Dakota requires doctors, as a matter of “in-
formed consent,” to warn abortion patients that this procedure puts 
them at “increased risk of suicide ideation and suicide.”31  And the 
State of New Mexico’s Human Rights Act prohibits public accommo-
dations from discriminating against people based on their sexual ori-
 
 23 Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310 (2010). 
 24 Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653 (2011). 
 25 United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460 (2010). 
 26 Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460 (2009). 
 27 See CARDOZO, supra note 5. 
 28 S. 1172, 2011-2012 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2012), available at https://leginfo.legislature.ca.
gov/faces/billNavClient.xhtml?bill_id=201120120SB1172.  See also Pickup v. Brown, 740 
F.3d 1208 (9th Cir. 2014) (discussing Sentate Bill 1172’s potential affect on free speech 
interests). 
 29 Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173 (1991). 
 30 United States v. Caronia, 703 F.3d 149 (2d Cir. 2012). 
 31 Planned Parenthood Minnesota, North Dakota, South Dakota v. Rounds, 686 F.3d 889, 
892, 894 (8th Cir. 2012). 
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entation.32  New Mexico would apply this prohibition to a commercial 
photographer who refuses to photograph a commitment ceremony 
between two women.  Is either law a violation of the regulated profes-
sional’s freedom of expression, as a form of “compelled speech?” 
Finally, the federal Food and Drug Administration adopted a ciga-
rette packaging rule that requires that cigarette packages add a large, 
graphic image designed to warn purchasers of the health risks of 
smoking.33  May the cigarette manufacturers refuse to redesign their 
packages on the ground that they have a First Amendment right not 
to be the Government’s messenger?34  If so, does that outcome affect 
the answer to either question above, especially whether doctors can 
be required to bear the government’s suicide warnings? 
The answers to these free speech questions are surprisingly un-
clear and complicated.  Seeing this requires a peek at the basic struc-
ture of free speech doctrine and an appreciation of the many ways in 
which the basic structure is subject to significant contextual riffs. 
The doctrinal rules can be visualized as four pyramids.  The most 
familiar principles focus on the content and nature of the expression 
and how both affect whether and how the speech is protected from 
government regulation.  They also focus on the purpose or justifica-
tion for government regulation of expression—especially whether it 
is targeted at suppression of information versus regulation of other, 
content-neutral, or “secondary effects.” 
These free speech “first steps” look like this: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 32 New Mexico Human Rights Act (NMHRA), N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 28-1-1 to 28-1-13 (West 
2014).  See also Elane Photography, LLC v. Willock, 309 P.3d 53 (N.M. 2013), cert. denied, 
134 S. Ct. 1787 (2014) (holding that application of the law to a commercial photographer 
did not violate her freedom of expression). 
 33 See infra note 181. 
 34 Id. 
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 Applying this pyramid alone would suggest that all of the exam-
ples above should fall under strict scrutiny, because in each the gov-
ernment is regulating private expression in a content—even view-
point—specific fashion.  One could argue that treatment by a mental 
health professional is actually conduct,35 even if delivered via speech, 
but the stronger argument is that expression is plainly involved here 
even though it may be regulated differently than other types of ex-
pression because of its therapeutic impact and setting.  Consequently, 
the psychologist, the photographer, the doctor, and the tobacco 
company all should have very powerful claims that the government 
regulations are presumptively unconstitutional. 
Of course, the cases are difficult because the matter is not this 
simple.  Common sense and considerable case law show that the 
“content-specific-regulation-equals-strict scrutiny” principle does not 
 
 35 See Pickup v. Brown, 740 F.3d 1208, 1215 (9th Cir. 2014) (stating that “medical ‘treat-
ment,’ . . . although effected by verbal communication nevertheless constitutes ‘profes-
sional conduct’”). 
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apply in many, many settings, including the ones in which these pri-
vate parties operate. 
One factor that can modify the basic principle has to do with the 
nature of the government burden in question.  A criminal prohibi-
tion on purely private speech about abortion, same-sex marriage, or 
the health risks of smoking would receive quite different judicial 
treatment than conditioning a government benefit, commercial activ-
ity, or professional license on compliance with speech-sensitive mes-
saging.  Incidental or conditional burdens on expression offer gov-
ernment more regulatory room than do direct prohibitions. 
A schematic, non-exhaustive illustration of the point looks like 
this: 
 
 Setting also matters.  A “pig in a parlor” is not tolerated in ways 
that it might be on the proverbial street corner.  A third doctrinal 
pyramid that focuses on the types of forums available for private ex-
pression also must be added to the doctrinal picture.  It looks like 
this: 
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A final, overlapping pyramid focuses on the speaker.  Private ac-
tors often assume public roles, or otherwise affect public interests in 
ways that may justify government limits on their expressive autonomy.  
As schematic reminder of this well-rehearsed limit on expressive au-
tonomy looks like this: 
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One could add a fifth pyramid, focused on whether the government 
is sufficiently involved in, or entangled with the expressive activity to 
deem the speech or its suppression to be “state action.”36  Of course, 
this same problem is a central part of Pyramid Four.  For purposes of 
this discussion, state action therefore will be presumed.37 
Implicit in all four pyramids is the free speech interest of the au-
dience or future speaker.  Regulation of the speaker obviously affects 
what the target audience does (or does not) hear, as well as what in-
formation future speakers may gain or lose.  Most expression (though 
not all:  think a personal diary or book of poetry, buried in one’s back 
yard)38 has an explicitly interactive and social element.  The 
cost/benefit analysis that is embedded in the basic free speech tests 
thus cannot be fully understood without these audience interests in 
mind, however they are expressed.39 
 
 36 This issue is of colossal importance in the Internet era, given that private actors control 
access to major communication channels.  See Derek E. Bambauer, Ghost in the Network, 
162 U. PA. L. REV. 1011, 1019 (2014) (discussing government regulation of cyberactivity); 
Derek E. Bambauer, Orwell’s Armchair, 79 U. CHI. L. REV. 863, 869 (2012) (exploring the 
proper role of government in regulating the Internet which is primarily owned by private 
actors); Jeffrey Rosen, The Deciders:  Facebook, Google, and the Future of Privacy and Free Speech, 
in CONSTITUTION 3.0:  FREEDOM AND TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE, 69, 80–81 (Jeffrey Rosen 
& Benjamin Wittes eds., 2011) (examining how Internet companies have regulated 
speech). 
 37 One also could add a pyramid that displayed the range of harms that speech can cause 
and how the perceived risk or severity of the harm influences whether speech is protect-
ed.  This factor, however, is an inherent assignment of the level of scrutiny applied to 
speech (such as compelling interest or important interest) as well as the degree to which 
courts will defer to government estimations of harm under an assigned level. 
 38 See infra text accompanying note 87. 
 39 Sometimes these audience-sensitive concerns surface as reasons to curb the speech.  See, 
e.g., Citizens United  v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 394 , 419–21 (2010) (Ste-
vens, J., dissenting) (discussing the distortion of political speech that can occur when 
economically powerful voices dominate); Brandenburg  v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 448–49 
(1969) (overturning a statute on grounds that it did not adequately distinguish between 
incitement and constitutionally protected advocacy speech); Feiner v. New York, 340 U.S. 
315, 320–21 (1951) (finding that speech that provokes hostile audiences is protected but 
loses protection once it becomes incitement); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 
568, 573 (1942) (holding that fighting words are not protected speech).   
   Other times they surface as objections to regulation, based on the fuzzy “right to re-
ceive ideas,” or arguments for a public right of access to government controlled data.  See, 
e.g., Bd. of Educ., Island Trees Sch. Free Union Dist. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 872 (1982) 
(holding that school boards may not remove books because they dislike the ideas in the 
books); Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564, 568 (1969) (preventing states from crimi-
nalizing the private possession of obscene material); Lamont v. Postmaster Gen., 381 U.S. 
301, 306–07 (1965) (overturning a statute that required an addressee to write to the 
Postmaster General in order to receive communist propaganda material).   
   In the theoretical arena, the audience interest is most visible within the “marketplace 
of ideas,” or political-based theories about the reach of freedom of expression.  See also 
Seana Valentine Shiffrin, A Thinker-Based Approach to Freedom of Speech, 27 CONST. 
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The above points may seem embarrassingly obvious.  Yet the case 
law and especially its most triumphant free speech rhetoric often 
suppress the obvious.  Thus, it bears repeating as we consider the 
foregoing arguments of the licensed professional, the commercial 
photographer, and the tobacco company:  content regulation of 
speech often happens without judicial strict scrutiny. 
Yet much will hinge on whether they can locate their expression 
above-the-line and not subject to one of the many caveats to full strict 
scrutiny.  The strict scrutiny test is extraordinarily difficult to meet 
when the speech falls on the tip of each of the four pyramids.40 
The government, in turn, will argue that their otherwise above-
the-line speech falls within one of the traditional exceptions to free 
speech (for example, incitement, fighting words, true threats), that 
no viewpoint discrimination within that exception has occurred,41 that 
the expression is more conduct than speech, or that other reasons 
support allowing it to regulate the speech without satisfying strict 
scrutiny per se.42  If it fails, then government has the heavy burden of 
proving that the regulation advances a compelling government pur-
pose in a narrowly tailored fashion. 
The government may remind the Court of how much expression 
by commercial actors and regulated professionals falls below the most 
exacting scrutiny line,43 and may not even receive intermediate scru-
tiny.44  For example, price-fixing, much speech covered by trademark 
law,45 securities prospectuses, speech that has independent legal sig-
 
COMMENT. 283, 283–84 (2011) (discussing theories that provide a foundation for free 
speech protections). 
 40 The test is not impossible to meet.  See, e.g., Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. 
Ct. 2705, 2731 (2010) (finding that an anti-terrorism statute that abridged freedom of 
speech survived strict scrutiny because it provided for the common defense). 
 41 R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 382–83 (1992) (noting traditional limited expecta-
tions to free speech). 
 42 The Court has said that the categorical exceptions cover speech that government has an 
interest in regulating because of the “distinctively proscribable content”; thus, they meet 
strict scrutiny.  Id. at 384.  The categories may be seen as short hand ways of assuring that 
government has a compelling, historically grounded reason for the regulation, and the 
overbreadth doctrine assures that the regulations are narrowly tailored. 
 43 The Court has noted that “[t]he inquiry into the protected status of speech is one of law, 
not fact.”  Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 148 n.7 (1983). 
 44 Government’s own speech is a special case analysis.  See infra text accompanying notes 
141–51. 
 45 But see Rebecca Tushnet, Trademark Law as Commercial Speech Regulation, 58 S.C. L. REV. 
737, 738 (2007) (discussing the different approach of First Amendment law and trade-
mark law and noting that the “expansion of trademark law to include protection against 
dilution, which operates even when consumers are not confused or deceived, puts obvi-
ous pressure on [reasoning that trademark and false advertising laws pose no constitu-
tional problems because they regulate only false and misleading commercial speech]”). 
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nificance as a “performative act” (such as saying “I do!” at a wedding 
ceremony or “You have a deal!” in a contract case) fall below the ele-
vated scrutiny line.46 
The government also may argue that speech by commercial actors 
and professionals has long received First Amendment treatment that 
differs from “street corner” speech by private parties.  For example, 
commercial speech once received only rational basis review—the lev-
el of scrutiny generally applied to socioeconomic legislation under 
substantive due process.  That a commercial actor used pure speech 
to hawk his or her wares did not alter the constitutional analysis.  In 
1976, the Court hoisted this speech above-the-line and today, com-
mercial speech regulations are subject to the Central Hudson test—but 
this only gives “commercial speech” (properly defined)47 elevated, not 
full-blown, strict scrutiny.  And the advertisement must be truthful, 
not misleading, and about a legal activity.48 
Finally, the government should explain that the movement of 
commercial speech to elevated scrutiny status has not been smooth.  
Concerns about the potential dangers of commercial speech still 
prompt government interventions that are content-specific, speaker-
specific, audience-protective, burdensome, and even viewpoint-
specific.49  The Central Hudson test permits these adjustments, if the 
government can prove that they are based on a significant govern-
ment interest and are properly tailored to advance that interest.  
Such adjustments would doom the same measures were they aimed at 
pure “political speech”; and traditional First Amendment bromides 
about curing bad speech with counter speech mesh poorly with some 
commercial regulatory schemes premised on pessimistic assumptions 
about our cognitive capacities and decision-making skills.50  The 
Court insists that regulators avoid justifications that smack of pure pa-
 
 46 Speech can migrate upward, though this presents doctrinal complexities.  See infra text 
accompanying notes 104–25. 
 47 See Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 66–68 (1983) (discussing character-
istics of commercial speech). 
 48 Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of New York, 447 U.S. 557, 566 
(1980) (holding that protected commercial speech must concern a lawful activity and not 
be misleading).  The same is true of many torts that are now subject to First Amendment 
caveats, such as defamation, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and public disclo-
sure of private facts.  The cases set forth a patchwork of tests that may limit recovery, ele-
vate standards of proof, or require malice as a condition of recovery in ways that depart 
from the basic rules about content-specific regulation of speech in other contexts. 
 49 See, e.g., Coyote Publ’g, Inc. v. Miller, 598 F.3d 592 (9th Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 
1556 (2011) (upholding a ban on brothel ads in Nevada, which allows the sale of sexual 
services in some counties).  
 50 Id. at 566 (establishing a four part test to analyze commercial speech cases). 
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ternalism,51 but it has not yet abandoned the intermediate scrutiny 
approach to commercial speech regulation. 
The government also might refer to other cases in which local 
government is allowed to regulate commercial actors in ways that de-
part from traditional strict scrutiny for content-specific regulations.  
For example, differential zoning of adult businesses that present or 
sell sexually explicit expression triggers elevated but not strict consti-
tutional attention.  The Court strained doctrinal credulity to get 
there, by declaring that the zoning of adult businesses is prompted by 
a “content-neutral” justification of containing “secondary effects” ra-
ther than regulation aimed at suppressing the community effects of a 
particular category of undeniably expressive, but disfavored materi-
al.52  It also imposed an amazingly weak evidentiary burden on local 
governments to prove that secondary effects, not distaste for sexually 
explicit materials and those who sell them, were the basis for the con-
tent-specific zoning decisions.53 
These outlier cases and the many examples of commercial and 
professional regulation that historically have not triggered strict scru-
tiny make it both easier and harder to advance new arguments for lo-
cating categories of speech above-the-line.  It is easier because more 
types of speech today are located above-the-line—including speech 
that historically was subject solely to toothless rational basis review.  
Commercial speech is an excellent example of a relatively recent and 
dramatic movement of speech to greater speech protection.  Advo-
cates can argue that the potential adverse consequences of protecting 
other historically unprotected speech are no worse than the potential 
harms of protecting Viagra, casino, liquor, or tobacco advertisements. 
Yet the fuzziness also can make it harder to elevate traditionally 
non-protected expression to elevated scrutiny.  The outlier cases 
demonstrate the many difficulties of managing grey zone cases.  Fear 
of making the doctrinal morass worse may cause some justices to balk 
at moving traditionally unprotected speech to semi-protected status.  
Relocating expression wholly above-the-line also raises significant 
 
 51 See 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 503 (1996) (noting that “[t]he First 
Amendment directs us to be especially skeptical of regulations that seek to keep people in 
the dark for what the government perceives to be their own good”).  Even regulation of 
“misleading” commercial speech may be vulnerable if the speech is truthful. 
 52 See City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 47 (1986) (introducing the 
“secondary effects” justification). 
 53 City of Los Angeles v. Alameda Books, Inc., 535 U.S. 425, 453 (2002) (upholding a City of 
Los Angeles ordinance that relied on a 1977 study).  But see AnnexBooks, Inc. v. City of 
Indianapolis, 740 F. 3d 1136 (7th Cir. 2014) (striking down ordinance for lack of statisti-
cally significant evidence). 
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risks if one considers the public policy issues at stake and believes 
government regulations best promote these interests despite the pri-
vate speech costs. 
Finally, once lifted, speech rarely moves back downward.  Com-
mon law torts that once allowed recovery for some defamatory or of-
fensive speech but that now are subject to free speech defenses are 
one example.54  Another powerful example is race or gender “hate 
speech.”  This speech currently falls above-the-line but was subject 
during the late 1980s and early 1990s to strenuous arguments that it 
should be categorically downgraded.  Hate speech is a peculiarly de-
structive form of speech that shares features of traditional free speech 
exceptions such as libel, true threats, fighting words, or verbal har-
assment.55  Critics maintain that hate speech also undermines demo-
cratic discourse, chills contributions to the “marketplace of ideas,” 
and invades individual autonomy more than it advances that goal.  It 
may compromise equality goals, which have independent constitu-
tional salience, and are imbedded in basic free speech principles 
about speaker autonomy, prohibitions on viewpoint discrimination, 
and diversity of viewpoints.56 
The Court nevertheless refused to permit government to regulate 
this speech as a categorical exception, even if it was contained within 
a traditional exception to strict scrutiny.57  For example, measures 
that prohibit only fighting words based on race or gender were 
deemed to be impermissible viewpoint discrimination within a free 
speech exception—like selecting out only obscenity written by Demo-
crats for prohibition.58 
 
 54 See Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207, 1215 (2011) (applying free speech principles in case 
involving tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress); N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 
376 U.S. 254, 282–83 (1964) (applying free speech principles to tort of defamation). 
 55 See, e.g., Charles R. Lawrence III, If He Hollers Let Him Go:  Regulating Racist Speech on Cam-
pus, 1990 DUKE L. J. 431, 453 (1990) (discussing the differences between racial insults and 
protected speech); Mari J. Matsuda, Public Response to Racist Speech:  Considering the Victim’s 
Story, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2320, 2357–58 (1989) (“Racist speech . . . presenting an idea so 
historically untenable, so dangerous, and so tied to perpetuation of violence . . . it is 
properly treated as outside the realm of protected discourse.”); Richard Delgado, Words 
That Wound:  A Tort Action for Racial Insults, Epithets, and Name-Calling, 17 HARV. C.R.-C.L. 
L. REV. 133, 178–79 (1982) (arguing that freedom of expression generally benefits socie-
ty, but racism and hate speech “further[] all the evils caused by the suppression of 
speech”).  For a recent, especially ambitious theoretical work arguing that hate speech 
should be regulable, see JEREMY WALDRON, THE HARM IN HATE SPEECH 15–17 (2012). 
 56 See Toni M. Massaro, Equality and Freedom of Expression:  The Hate Speech Dilemma, 32 WM. & 
MARY L. REV. 211, 214 (1991) (discussing the tension between equality and liberal theo-
ries of freedom of expression, as applied to hate speech). 
 57 R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 387 (1992). 
 58 Id. at 388. 
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As I will explain, downgrading speech also has gotten harder in 
recent years.  The Roberts Court recently stated that the only legiti-
mate, categorical exceptions are historical and traditional ones:  new 
ones cannot be coined, only “discovered.”59  Consequently, the consti-
tutional ratchet arguably works upward only.60 
The Court’s ostensibly formulaic and tiered approach to free 
speech has produced applications, holdings, and exceptions that 
make the “rules” hard to take seriously.  They also constrain the 
Court’s own ability to balance relevant concerns. 
Again, the history of hate speech regulation is instructive.  Be-
cause the case law regards most regulation of hate speech as imper-
missible content-specific regulation, the government must adopt 
broader rules to capture the worst forms of hate speech (for example, 
it must prohibit all fighting words, including hate speech), or write 
rules aimed only at the “conduct” component of hate speech.61  Gov-
ernment also can regulate racist speech in bounded settings, such as 
the workplace and public schools, but in ways that are difficult to 
square with general claims that government cannot impose viewpoint 
orthodoxy or impose “political correctness.”62  At the same time, the 
private social, economic, and professional penalties for using race- or 
gender-inflamed speech have mounted.63  Not all speech regulation 
derives from law, and the state action doctrine insulates private 
speech sanctions from constitutional control.  Context therefore still 
matters to regulation of hate speech, as it does for all above-the-line 
speech.  But its offensive content also still matters, in ways that betray 
residual unease with simplistic statements that the First Amendment 
protects speaker rights even if the speaker is bigoted, vile, cruel, or 
disgusting.64 
 
 59 See infra text accompanying notes 130–31. 
 60 An important caveat to this are cases in which the Roberts Court has weakened protection 
of other expression, such as public employee speech.  See infra note 97. 
 61 Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 798, 809 (2000). 
 62 For example, government employers could discipline an employee for racist speech that 
disrupts the workplace or creates a hostile working environment.  See Eugene Volokh, 
What Speech Does “Hostile Work Environment” Harassment Law Restrict?, 85 Geo. L.J. 627 
(1997) (discussing workplace speech restrictions and implications for freedom of speech 
values). 
 63 Consider, for example, the recent controversy over food show celebrity Paula Deen, who 
lost multiple business contracts after evidence surfaced that she used racist epithets in the 
past. 
 64 The emerging problems of “revenge porn” and nonconsensual sharing or re-publication 
of  sexually explicit texts—called “sexts”—show how complicated the doctrinal issues can 
become even when the “speech” in question is truthful, not misleading, was self-created, 
and meant for purely intimate exchange.  See, e.g., Derek E. Bambauer, Exposed, 98 MINN. 
L. REV. 2025, 2032–33 (2014) (discussing harms and solutions regarding the sharing of 
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In short, current free speech doctrine is very multi-factored and 
fractured.  Traditional pro-speech bromides and Pyramid One prin-
ciples suppress this complexity. 
B.  Methodologicial Coherence 
Yet despite the many ambiguities and caveats within free speech 
doctrine, especially at the boundary line between elevated scrutiny 
and rational basis scrutiny, there is a methodological “there there,” of 
sorts.  Tiers matter; the basic rules of Pyramid One matter; aspiration-
al free speech rhetoric matters; but flexibility and realism also matter. 
This is best seen by re-examining the four pyramids, as well as the 
quite strong consensus among scholars, judges and lawyers about how 
to argue within them. 
1.  Pyramid One 
Pyramid One displays how the expressive dimension of conduct 
must dominate for the expression to make it above-the-line.  Also, if 
the expression is being regulated for other speech-neutral reasons, and 
is aimed at behavior that is more properly characterized as conduct, 
then the government often need only satisfy rational basis.  For ex-
ample, if a political activist resorts to violent acts to express her politi-
cal views—say, by soliciting a co-conspirator to assassinate the Presi-
dent, or by hurling a dirty bomb into a Fourth of July celebration—
the First Amendment offers no refuge.  Both acts are “expressive” and 
political; yet neither is protected, and neither is subject to freedom of 
speech basic rules.  Rational basis applies, and is easily satisfied. 
In some cases, however, the government regulation in question 
may aim at conduct in a manner that scoops up substantial expres-
sion.  In this grey zone between the basic rules (strict scrutiny) and 
rational basis, the Court will conduct an analysis to determine wheth-
er the government purpose for regulating the conduct is speech neu-
tral, and whether the regulation leaves open ample alternative ave-
nues of expression.65 
A similar “grey zone” analysis involves content-specific regulation 
of expression where the government insists its primary goal is to con-
 
intimate media such as sexts); John A. Humbach, ‘Sexting’ and the First Amendment, 37 
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 433, 438–49 (2010) (considering the implications of sexting and 
First Amendment protections). 
 65 See United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 381–82 (1968) (holding that the governmetal 
interest prohibiting the destruction of draft cards was aimed to ensure the functioning of 
the Selective Service System rather than prohibiting the plaintiff’s speech). 
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tain the “secondary effects” of the speech (for example, zoning of 
adult businesses).66  Aiming at expression to suppress knowledge trig-
gers the loudest free speech alarms, and courts are most aggressive 
when they conclude this is the government’s true purpose.  Aiming at 
speech to suppress crime or preserve order triggers a lower level of 
scrutiny. 
Pyramid One is the most formidable one in the freedom of speech 
landscape because it sets forth the most fundamental distinctions on 
which all subsequent characterization moves depend.  This is why 
judges and scholars fret most over locating speech above or below the 
elevated scrutiny line in that frame:  the doctrinal, normative and 
practical consequences of this categorization move are the most pro-
found. 
2.  Pyramid Two 
Pyramid Two shows that the nature of the burden imposed may 
alter the fate of a speech restriction.  For example, when the only 
burden imposed on the speech is a legitimate time, place, manner 
limit—not an absolute prohibition of the speech—then intermediate 
scrutiny applies.67  Also key to this inquiry is the government’s purpose 
in regulating the expression—specifically, whether the regulation is 
adopted “without reference to the content of the regulated speech.”68  
 
 66 See supra text accompanying notes 52–53. 
 67 See, e.g., Thomas v. Chi. Park Dist., 534 U.S. 316, 321–22 (2002) (upholding permit system 
as valid, content-neutral licensing ordinance); Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 
781, 791 (1989) (setting forth content-neutrality test). 
 68 Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 719–20 (2000); see also id. (holding that a government reg-
ulation is “‘content neutral’ if is justified without reference to the content of regulated 
speech”); Schenck v. Pro-Choice Network of W. N.Y., 519 U.S. 357, 384–85 (1997) (up-
holding fixed buffer zones around abortion clinics because such injunctions were not 
content based); Madsen v. Women’s Health Ctr., 512 U.S. 753, 763 (1994) (“[T]he fact 
that the injunction covered people with a particular viewpoint does not itself render the 
injunction content or viewpoint based.”). 
   This can be a fraught inquiry, as recent abortion protest, funeral protest, and free 
speech “bubble” cases show.  See, e.g., Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207, 1220 (2011) (find-
ing a funeral protest to be protected speech); see also McCullen v. Coakley, 134 S. Ct. 2518 
(2014) (striking down buffer zones around abortion clinics); see generally Erwin Chemer-
insky, Content Neutrality as a Central Problem of Freedom of Speech:  Problems in the Supreme 
Court’s Application, 74 S. CAL. L. REV. 49, 49 (2000) (noting that almost every recent free 
speech case turned on whether the law was characterized as content neutral); Alan K. 
Chen, Statutory Speech Bubbles, First Amendment Overbreadth, and Improper Legislative Purpose, 
38 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 31, 34 (2003) (discussing how lawmakers may draft overbroard 
speech regulations to obscure an illicit discriminatory legislative purpose); Geoffrey R. 
Stone, Content-Neutral Restrictions, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 46, 46 (1987) (analyzing the Court’s 
content-neutral versus content-specific distinction). 
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A bad government purpose, under the First Amendment, is to regu-
late speech “because of disagreement with the message it conveys.”69 
Pyramid Two makes especially vivid why flexible, rather than for-
malistic, approaches to free speech analysis better anticipate the 
range of regulatory burdens courts may encounter, and why results 
may change as burdens lighten.  It is—and should be—easier for gov-
ernment to justify non-funding of expression than prohibition of ex-
pression.  Likewise, it is—and should be—easier for government to 
justify speech burdens on private persons who voluntarily enter pro-
fessions, commercial or public settings, or assume other roles in 
which their speech is constrained in ways that would not be allowed 
“off the job.”  Of course, there also are limits on the government 
power to set these speech conditions, and drawing that constitutional 
line is an intensely context-specific matter.70 
3.  Pyramid Three 
Pyramid Three adds one of these context-sensitive caveats:  the 
place of expression must be a public forum for elevated scrutiny—even 
the more relaxed scrutiny given to content-neutral time, place, man-
ner regulations or other “grey zone” regulations—to kick in.  If an 
adult political speaker wishes to “parade” through a military base, 
then the speech falls below even the grey zone line of First Amend-
ment elevated scrutiny.  Put a familiar way, no “pigs in the non-public 
forum parlor.” 
4.  Pyramid Four 
Finally, Pyramid Four shows that speaker identity matters.  Con-
trary to statements by the Roberts Court that imply that speaker-
sensitive speech rules always trigger strict scrutiny,71 the doctrine 
plainly points to an opposite conclusion.72  Speaker-identity distinc-
tions explain much of the vast terrain below the elevated scrutiny 
line, where the constitutional presumption strongly favors govern-
ment decisions about whether, and how, to burden expression.  In 
many of these cases, the speakers are defined according to occupa-
 
 69 Ward, 491 U.S. at 791. 
 70 See infra text accompanying notes 217–18. 
 71 See infra text accompanying notes 104–27. 
 72 Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 419–25 (2010) (Stevens, J., con-
curring in part and dissenting in part) (denouncing language in the Court’s opinion re-
garding the speaker identity restriction as a rationale for treating corporate and union 
campaign expenditures the same as individual expenditures). 
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tional, trade, or other roles that determine their expressive autonomy 
and responsibilities.73  Indeed, the Constitution itself makes this 
point:  it contains an explicit and mandatory script for the Presiden-
tial oath of office.74  This is surely “compelled speech” yet also clearly 
allowed.  In sum, who you are determines—in a dizzying array of cir-
cumstances—what you can say without significant, even criminal con-
sequences.  This is closely related to how different speech burdens af-
fect the inquiry, as outlined in Pyramid Two:  role-specific burdens 
tend not to be absolute prohibitions on speech and thus trigger a 
lower level of scrutiny.75 
C.  Theoretical Struts 
The doctrinal landscape also is undergirded by common theoreti-
cal struts.  These likewise are expansive and context-sensitive, include 
leaps of faith, are internally contradictory, but nevertheless are a cru-
cial part of understanding how courts approach freedom of expres-
sion problems.  The most influential theoretical justifications take 
three forms:  arguments from democracy, or political-based theo-
ries;76 arguments from autonomy, or liberalism-based theories;77 and 
consequentialist arguments from knowledge or “truth.”78  Each sug-
gests an important value served by free speech protection that courts 
invoke to grant protection to speech despite its harmful consequenc-
es.  All thus help explain the case law that elevates certain expression, 
in proper contexts, to elevated scrutiny.  Yet none by itself adequately 
explains all of the terrain below the line of elevated scrutiny, or offers 
a complete explanation for speech that falls above-the-line but is un-
protected due to the many doctrinal caveats. 
First Amendment theoretical work to date that attempts to craft a 
unifying free speech lens comes in two forms.  The first begins with 
actual and potential applications of freedom of expression principles 
 
 73 See infra text accompanying notes 252–53. 
 74 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1. 
 75 See supra text accompanying notes 67–70. 
 76 See, e.g., MEIKLEJOHN, infra note 81, at 27 (“[C]onflicting views may be expressed, must be 
expressed, not because they are valid, but because they are relevant.”). 
 77 See, e.g., C. Edwin Baker, Scope of the First Amendment Freedom of Speech, 25 UCLA L. REV. 
964, 994 (1978) (arguing that voluntary speech is an act of creative self-definition or ex-
pression); Martin H. Redish, The Value of Free Speech, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 591, 593 (1982) 
(“[T]he constitutional guarantee of free speech ultimately serves only one true value, 
which I have labeled ‘individual self-realization.’”). 
 78 Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (“[T]he best 
test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the 
market . . . .”). 
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and tries to knit them into a more unified and convincing whole.79  
The second form begins with theoretical baselines, and proceeds 
from these baselines to doctrinal applications.80  All seek to make an 
analytical whole of this constitutional right.  Many focus primarily on 
the scope of the First Amendment, i.e. its “coverage,” rather than on 
the specific rules about how to deal with speech that falls within this 
coverage.81 
Unfortunately, even the most heroic efforts fall short. 
Theories that are analytically crisp enough to limit applications of 
freedom of speech in a meaningful way often cannot be squared with 
a vast amount of modern doctrine and contemporary free speech in-
tuition,82 which makes them practically and normatively suspect.  
These theoretical works rarely make a dent in the doctrine itself be-
cause they blink at too much doctrinal rhetoric and practice to pre-
vail.  Judges are massively reluctant to dislodge or substantially nar-
row bodies of case law that already protect certain expression, even 
when the case law may be analytically or theoretically indefensible.  
The theories also are normatively suspect because they omit coverage 
of speech that we have grown accustomed to protecting, or block pro-
tection to expression many people believe is worthy of constitutional 
protection. 
Theories that attempt to map their normative framework onto ex-
isting doctrine, and develop normative explanations for its limited 
scope,83 raise another concern:  they sound like “just so stories.”  For 
example, in his analysis of free speech and expert knowledge, Robert 
Post has argued that the First Amendment stands for protection of 
“forms of conduct we deem necessary for the free formation of public 
opinion,”84 and then links his theory to preferred doctrinal results.  
He focuses in particular on the collision between theories of speech 
 
 79 See ROBERT C. POST, DEMOCRACY, EXPERTISE, AND ACADEMIC FREEDOM:  A FIRST 
AMENDMENT JURISPRUDENCE FOR THE MODERN STATE 5 (2012) (“To determine the pur-
poses of the First Amendment, therefore, we must consult the actual shape of entrenched 
First Amendment jurisprudence.”). 
 80 See generally C. EDWIN BAKER, HUMAN LIBERTY AND FREEDOM OF SPEECH (1989) (setting 
forth an autonomy-based theory of freedom of expression).  
 81 See, e.g., ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-GOVERNMENT 
(1984) (setting forth a democracy-based theory of freedom of expression that attempts to 
restrict the scope of the First Amendment to political speech, narrowly defined). 
 82 See, e.g., ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM:  THE CONSTITUTIONAL POWERS OF 
THE PEOPLE 4 (1948) (discussing the popular belief in governmental limitation of “dan-
gerous” speech); Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 
IND. L.J. 1 (1971) (lamenting the lack of a consistent theory within constitutional law).  
 83 See, e.g., POST, supra note 79. 
 84 Id. at 15. 
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that insist upon content- and viewpoint-neutrality, and the produc-
tion of expert knowledge.85 
Nobody wants a free-wheeling world of expert speech in which 
government has greatly restricted power to regulate speech of quacks 
or charlatans, or cannot umpire expertise disputes in ways that are 
content-specific and value-laden.  Post therefore is plainly right that 
content-neutrality driven theories that subject all such speech to a 
presumption of unconstitutionality make no real-world sense.  But 
even Post’s well-crafted alternative theoretical account, which he links 
to “systematic patterns” in doctrine,86 leaves the reader wondering 
why the doctrine he mostly accepts places things like animal crush 
videos or funeral picketing under the First Amendment umbrella, but 
not—say—obscenity.  Or why things we say privately, with no design 
or hope of influencing public opinion, should not be protected from 
content-based government regulation.87 
Even if one accepts his view that the “free formation of public 
opinion” is the organizing principle for freedom of speech coverage, 
this does not irrefutably demonstrate why speech “between dentists 
and their patients, between corporations and their shareholders, be-
tween product manufacturers and their customer” is not “normatively 
necessary for influencing public opinion.”88  A political theory of free 
speech, such as his, ultimately must define the boundaries of “politi-
cal” and “public”—no easy task.  This is especially so if one accepts 
the insight that “the personal is the political” or views existing doc-
trine as “consistent with the view that the fundamental purpose of the 
First Amendment is political, rather than ethical.”89 
As I explain more fully below, however, Post’s proposals should 
not be condemned on this basis alone.  All doctrine-respectful theo-
ries that attempt to limit the scope of free speech protection, to offer 
a unifying theory of that limit as expressed in the case law, and to ex-
plain more precisely where the boundary lines of protection should 
be drawn inevitably fall short of this very ambitious, perfectionist 
goal.  There is no one unifying theory that does the line-drawing job 
alone. 
 
 85 Id. at 9. 
 86 Id. at 13. 
 87 See, e.g., Baker, supra note 77, at 993 (discussing the problem of private expression); 
BAKER, supra note 80, at 6–46 (offering an especially thorough critique of marketplace 
and political process theories of free speech and offering an autonomy-based theory in-
stead). 
 88 POST, supra note 79, at 18. 
 89 Id. at 13. 
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Theories that attempt to expand constitutionally protected expres-
sion, and that likewise seek to justify currently protected expression, 
typically fail in a different way.  The open-armed theories often are 
too capacious to explain why any expression is not protected, or why 
some speech regulations receive strict scrutiny under current doc-
trine and others receive only rational basis or so-called intermediate 
scrutiny. 
These theories are great at explaining why speech is valuable in a 
liberal democracy that prizes individual autonomy, even if the con-
tent seems worthless to others; but even the best of them offer too lit-
tle by themselves to inform or justify much past, present, or future judi-
cial line-drawing that excludes some speech from the constitutional 
fold.90  For example, autonomy-based theories of freedom of expres-
sion better explain protection of sexually explicit expression and a lot 
of what passes for entertainment91—think of the fascination some 
have with the Kardashians or Honey Boo Boo—than do political the-
ories based on democratic self-governance and enlightened voters.  
But they ignore that “[m]uch speech that may be of great importance 
to the autonomy of individual speakers receives no First Amendment 
coverage at all.”92 
In short, all theories that begin with existing doctrine as a base-
line, or as strong evidence of what should be protected speech, inevi-
tably suffer from the problems of doctrine itself:  internal incon-
sistency, competing policy concerns, historical and political barriers, 
and analytically imperfect boundary decisions. 
Recognizing this—or seeking to evade the problem—some consti-
tutional theorists simply ignore doctrine.93  They begin instead with 
“big theory” musings and let the doctrinal chips fall where they may.  
These are often intriguing works but present the “smell of the lamp” 
 
 90 The best ones see the concern about meaningful limits and seek to meet it.  For example, 
Baker distinguishes between protected expression under his liberty theory and uses of 
property within a market exchange to explain why commercial speech is subject to regu-
lation.  See BAKER, supra note 80, at 196–224.  Key to his account of protected speech is 
whether it is “an attempt to create or affect the world in a way that has any logical or in-
trinsic connection to anyone’s substantive values or personal wishes.”  Id. at 196. 
 91 See Ronald K.L. Collins & David M. Skover, Pissing in the Snow:  A Cultural Approach to the 
First Amendment, 45 STAN. L. REV. 783, 785 (1993) (offering a decidedly unromantic look 
at how electronic technologies “affect the very logic of much thought and discourse” and 
outlining a “cultural approach” to freedom of expression that takes this drive to enter-
tainment rather than enlightenment into account). 
 92 POST, supra note 79, at 11. 
 93 See, e.g., Shiffrin, supra note 39 (advocating for a “thinker-based foundation,” rather than 
a speaker-based or listener-based justification, for freedom of speech protections). 
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problem, because they are conceived in a context removed from real 
world pressures—especially stare decisis. 
Doctrine-free theorizing thus is of limited usefulness to those who 
respect the “one artery” insight that motivates these First Amendment 
theorists, but who also wish to translate First Amendment theory into 
modern judicial practice.  At some point, judges must operationalize 
constitutional theory, and must consider the powerful constraints of 
stare decisis and the common law method of decision-making.94 
So we are left with an intractable dilemma.  Work that seeks to 
reconcile normative theory with doctrine suffers inevitably and criti-
cally from the normative incommensurables within the doctrine, as 
well as from the analytical gaps that are inherent in our common law 
method of constitutional interpretation.  Work that ignores the doc-
trine risks irrelevance to real-world constitutional problem solving.  
And work that refuses to consult theory at all risks being normatively 
rudderless, especially when it confronts new forms of expression or 
government regulation that fall outside conventional doctrinal cate-
gories. 
The real value of the free speech theories is that they remind 
judges of the normative stakes of doctrinal decisions.  Even the most 
romantic rhetoric is of practical use because it cautions judges about 
pathological fears—that “[m]en feared witches and burnt women.”95  
It harkens back to baseline democratic values and respect for indi-
vidual autonomy, which place decision making in individual hands 
even though they are not particularly skillful.  This push away from 
government regulation surely is not always prudent, but we abandon 
it at our peril.  Even progressives fear a world in which too much 
speech is controlled by government, “for our own good.”96  The tradi-
tional theoretical struts of the First Amendment have a homily effect 
that may serve a worthy civic purpose, despite our lapses into magical 
thinking about individual cognitive abilities.  Holding fast to free 
speech protection is hardly a natural or historically consistent in-
stinct:  recall that most of the law we now have has developed since 
1960, with the support of the more expansive theoretical expressions 
and free speech aphorisms.  The key is to cabin the magical thinking 
 
 94 See McDonald v. City of Chi., 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3028–31 (2010) (refusing to overturn the 
post-Slaughter-house Cases case law that rendered the Fourteenth Amendment Privileges or 
Immunities Clause a virtual dead letter, on the ground that too much time and doctrine 
stood in the way). 
 95 Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 376 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring). 
 96 J.M. Balkin, Some Realism About Pluralism:  Legal Realist Approaches to the First Amendment, 
1990 DUKE L.J. 375, 419 (1990). 
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that our most soaring free speech rhetoric inspires while preserving 
its positive effects, and to see more clearly free speech doctrine and 
practice as a complex balance between liberal aspirations and practi-
cal realities. 
D.  Summary 
Speech must land above multiple lines to receive full-dress, strict 
judicial scrutiny.  Most speech does not make it there. 
Speech that is placed above-the-line—even in the grey zones—and 
is not subject to a traditional exception, gains extremely significant 
protection.  Speech that rises to the peaks of all four pyramids is 
nearly invulnerable.  Thus, it matters greatly where speech is placed, 
and its berth—once identified—is quite hard to adjust.97 
But the four pyramids and their theoretical struts leave courts with 
tremendous room to modify the basic rules thought to govern con-
tent-specific regulation of speech.  Taken together, they show that 
 
 97 As explained below, however, the current Court has made this last statement far less con-
vincing than it was only a decade ago.  See infra text accompanying notes 102–22.  The 
Court has fortified the protection afforded to above-the-line speech.  But it also has cast 
doubt on the ongoing viability of all of the Pyramid Four distinctions in ways that may de-
stabilize many government regulations that are premised on speaker identity.  It has done 
so using absolutist language that cannot be squared with the shape of Pyramid Four (it 
flattens the pyramid), or the context-specific float it anticipates.  It also counters the 
Court’s long-standing practice of recognizing the First Amendment difference between 
statements made in one’s individual, wholly “private” capacity, and those made through 
corporate status, regulated professional status, commercial actor status, or other roles 
that may bear materially on whether one’s speech is “free.”  It cannot even be squared 
with some of the Roberts Court’s own recent rulings.  For example, speech by govern-
ment employees made during the course of their official duties now is categorically below 
the line.  See Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 421 (2006) (holding that “when public 
employees make statements pursuant to their official duties, the employees are not speak-
ing as citizens for First Amendment purposes, and the Constitution does not insulate 
their communications from employer discipline”); cf. Lane v. Franks, 134 S. Ct. 2369 
(2014) (holding unanimously that a public employee who testifies truthfully at trial, pur-
suant to a subpoena, is protected from discipline for that speech, where the testimony was 
not made pursuant to duties as an employee); Demers v. Austin, 729 F.3d 1011 (9th Cir. 
2013) (holding Garcetti inapplicable to teaching or writing on academic matters by teach-
ers employed by the state in higher education).   
   The biggest problem with all of these newer cases is that they speak in absolutist 
terms.  See, e.g., Helen Norton, Constraining Public Employee Speech:  Government’s Control of 
Its Workers’ Speech to Protect Its Own Expression, 59 DUKE L.J. 1, 7–8 (2009) (arguing for a 
new constitutional framework for government speech that is more context sensitive); 
Charles W. “Rocky” Rhodes, Public Employee Speech Rights Fall Prey to an Emerging Doctrinal 
Formalism, 15 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 1173, 1187 (2007) (critiquing the rejection of bal-
ancing in the context of public employee speech cases).  The lines between the categories 
of “protected” and “unprotected” are better viewed as permeable in practice, and proper-
ly so. 
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strict scrutiny still is more of the exception than the rule when it comes 
to judicial review of government regulations of private expression. 
In a vast number of settings, the government can regulate the 
content—not just the time, manner, or place—of our expression.98   
This applies even to our political expression.99  The landscape of free 
speech doctrine thus is undulating, not flat.  What we see most visibly 
are the peaks of speech protection, but they are undergirded by con-
siderable land that is not subject to meaningful review. 
Saying that freedom of speech is a “fundamental right” and a 
highly favored one is a true statement, but it also is a misleading one.  
The most famous aphorisms of free speech—for example, one can-
not cry “fire” falsely in a crowded theater;100 “one man’s vulgarity is 
another’s lyric”;101 the best response to bad speech is counter speech, 
“[i]f there be time”102—describe only a small fraction of the doctrinal 
pyramids. 
And even speech that falls  within the First Amendment sweet spot 
of strict scrutiny—at the peak of all four pyramids, and not within a 
categorical exception—still may be regulated, in extreme cases:  strict 
in theory is not necessarily “fatal in fact.”103  The big blanket of free-
dom of expression is revealed to be, on closer scrutiny, a hanky. 
In sum, the doctrine is messy for enduringly important historical 
and policy reasons.  Speech is ubiquitous, of widely varying value to 
society, and can cause countless harms that the government properly 
should try to prevent.  Application of free speech principles to com-
mon law and statutory zones developed without these principles in 
mind have their own, competing logic. 
Given this, absolutist approaches to free speech do not work, and 
the only viable alternative is messy:  balancing of interests.  Judges 
thus can hardly be blamed for producing case law that seems inter-
nally incoherent if one looks through a First Amendment lens alone. 
 
 98 See, e.g., Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410 (2006) (holding that government employees 
have no freedom of speech protection for speech pursuant to their official duties).  
 99 See, e.g., Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347 (1976) (discussing when restraints on political man-
agement and campaigning by public employees may be justified by government interests 
in efficiency and efficacy).  
100 Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919). 
101 Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 25 (1971). 
102 Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 377 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring). 
103 Gerald Gunther, Foreword:  In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court:  A Model for a 
Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1, 8 (1972); cf. Fisher v. Univ. of Tex., 133 S. Ct. 
2411, 2421 (2013) (noting that “[s]trict scrutiny must not be strict in theory, but fatal in 
fact”) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 
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Correlatively, neither doctrinal work nor theoretical work should 
be tossed aside simply because it too is analytically fissured, or does 
not alone solve the persistent problem of defining free speech 
boundaries.  No theory or proposed doctrinal reconstruction can, or 
will, mend all of the fissures or resolve all of the boundary disputes. 
Nor do these types of imperfections within the doctrine and lead-
ing theoretical works necessarily matter.  On the contrary, many of 
these imperfections serve other important values that may include 
protection of other constitutional rights. 
The right doctrinal question is not whether a specific area of free 
speech doctrine includes analytical flaws, but whether the flaws are 
irrational and harmful.  Do they make it harder to reach sound re-
sults in that particular zone, compromise the integrity of free speech 
reasoning in other zones, or cause significant, real-world injuries? 
The right theoretical question is not whether a theory solves every 
free speech problem, but whether it casts meaningful light on the diffi-
cult task of explaining the fundamental purpose of the First Amend-
ment.  Does it better guide judges and scholars than other theories 
do, while respecting other legitimate government purposes? 
Finally, the best approach to both inquiries is incrementalist, mul-
ti-factored, realistic, non-formalist, non-perfectionist, and evolution-
ary.  There is no one “fixed star” in the free speech universe.  Judges 
must follow multiple lights to make their way. 
II.  ROBERTS COURT RENOVATIONS COURT RENOVATIONS:  
METHODOLOGICAL AND THEORETICAL MISSTEPS  
The Roberts Court has made effecting the right balance between 
free speech realism and perfectionism much harder, and having an 
open judicial conversation about the internal complexities almost 
impossible. 
Rather, the Court seems intent upon modifying the basic free 
speech architecture with new, calcifying statements from which it 
cannot easily back up.  In an effort (apparently) to fortify freedom of 
speech protections in some contexts, the Roberts Court has embraced 
“open the floodgates” free speech rhetoric and theories in formalistic 
ways that are utterly blind to the well-known problems of open flood-
gates and formalism.  It has done this while ignoring completely the 
practical and significant limits on freedom of expression that the 
Court itself has imposed in other cognate areas simultaneously.  Three 
of the new moves are especially worrisome. 
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A.  The Speaker Identity Renovation 
The Court in 2011 struck down a Vermont law that banned the 
sale or disclosure by pharmacies of information about physicians’ 
prescribing habits, provided that the information would be used to 
market drugs by the pharmaceutical companies.104  The law did not 
apply to sale of the same information to private or academic re-
searchers.105  Detailers seek this information about doctor prescribing 
habits in order to hone their sales pitches.  Pharmacies have a mother 
lode of information about these habits and sell the information to da-
ta-mining companies.106  Vermont sought to regulate this practice.  
The primary goals of the Vermont law singling out this practice of 
selling prescriber-specific information were to protect doctor priva-
cy107 and to reduce the cost of medical services by shielding them 
from information by detailers (pharmaceutical company representa-
tives) about brand-name drugs.108 
The Court concluded in Sorrell v. IMS Health, Inc., that the Ver-
mont law violated the First Amendment.  Writing for the majority, 
Justice Anthony Kennedy emphasized that the statute in question 
“burdens disfavored speech by disfavored speakers.”109  It thus was 
both content- and speaker-identity specific. 
The opinion is an important one for many reasons:  it gives 
speech status to data; it treats the effort to regulate access to the data 
as regulation of expression rather than conduct; and it rejects the jus-
tifications offered by Vermont for treating detailers differently than 
other “speakers” as insufficient, despite their commercial interest in, 
and ultimate use of, the data.  Justice Kennedy also dismissed the 
State’s argument that detailing may result in a feeling of being “co-
erced” or “harassed” on the part of physicians.110  As he stated, 
“[a]bsent circumstances far from those presented here, the fear that 
 
104 Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653, 2659 (2011). 
105 Id. at 2660. 
106 See id. (“Pharmacies . . . receive prescriber-identifying information when processing pre-
scriptions . . . . Many pharmacies sell this information to ‘data miners,’ firms that analyze 
prescriber-identifying information and produce reports on prescriber behavior.”). 
107 See id. at 2668 (“[T]he State contends that its law is necessary to protect medical privacy, 
including physician confidentiality.”). 
108 See id. at 2670 (“The State contends that [its law] advances important public policy goals 
by lowering the costs of medical services and promoting public health.”). 
109 Id. at 2663. 
110 See id. at 2669 (“It is doubtful that concern for ‘a few’ physicians who may have ‘felt co-
erced and harassed’ by pharmaceutical marketers can sustain a broad content-based rule 
like § 4631(d).”). 
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speech might persuade provides no lawful basis for quieting it.”111  
Doctors are “‘sophisticated and experienced’ consumers.”112 
In stressing the speaker-identity specific feature of the law as a rea-
son to subject it to elevated scrutiny, Justice Kennedy revisited a 
theme that was central to his opinion in Citizens United v. Federal Elec-
tion Commission.113  In that case, the disfavored speaker was a corpora-
tion.  The Court rejected the argument that the corporate status of a 
speaker is a compelling reason to treat the “speech”—independent 
expenditures advocating the election of political candidates—
differently from the electoral speech of individuals.114 
The idea is neither novel nor unimportant in thinking about lev-
els of speech protection.  As Justice Lewis Powell said in First National 
Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, if we view the value of speech as informing 
the audience, then it follows that “[t]he inherent worth of the speech 
in terms of its capacity for informing the public does not depend up-
on the identity of its source, whether corporation, association, union, 
or individual.”115  Justice Kennedy agrees strongly with this view of re-
strictions based on the identity of the speaker.116 
Yet his claim in Citizens United that “[n]o case before Austin [v. 
Michigan Chamber of Commerce] had held that Congress could prohibit 
independent expenditures for political speech based on the speaker’s 
corporate identity”117 should not be taken out of context, or reduced 
to a less qualified assumption that all speaker-identity based re-
strictions trigger strict scrutiny.  Nevertheless, the passage about 
speaker identity in Sorrell—also written by Justice Kennedy—comes 
perilously close. 
Again, there is considerable free speech wisdom in compelling 
government to be agnostic about the source of speech when it en-
gages in regulation.  Distinctions based on speaker identity have the 
powerful whiff of viewpoint discrimination, and may violate the in-
ternal equality dimension that the First Amendment polices, if not 
the Equal Protection Clause itself. 
 
111 Id. at 2670 (citing Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (per curiam)). 
112 Id. at 2658 (quoting Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 775 (1993)). 
113 558 U.S. 310 (2010) (holding that government may not, under the First Amendment, 
suppress political speech on the basis of the speaker’s corporate identity). 
114 See id. at 341 (“We find no basis for the proposition that, in the context of political 
speech, the Government may impose restrictions on certain disfavored speakers.”). 
115 435 U.S. 765, 777 (1978). 
116 See Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 340 (“Speech restrictions based on the identity of the 
speaker are all too often simply a means to control content.”). 
117 Id. at 348. 
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But the unthinking application of this principle makes for imme-
diate mischief if one considers how much of the doctrine is doing just 
that—distinguishing among speakers.118  The source of speech mat-
ters greatly to a vast swath of regulation that limits what commercial 
speakers can say about their products, what professionals can say in 
delivering professional services, what government employees can say 
about internal matters, and what K–12 teachers can say about their 
subject matter. 
There may be—in fact, I am sure there are—“compelling” reasons 
why all of these “speaker-identity” driven regulations are not struck 
down on that basis.  Not all speakers, speaking on the same topics, 
whose speech is of undeniable value to “decisionmaking in a democ-
racy,”119 are situated similarly or speaking with similar motivations or 
incentives.  One therefore can concede, for example, that speech 
about the properties of a drug conveys valuable information to con-
sumers that deserves some First Amendment protection,120 yet resist a 
move to place speech by a product manufacturer on the same rung as 
speech by an individual actor about that drug.  In Sorrell, however, the 
Court chided Vermont for distinguishing between requests for pre-
scription-pattern data by pharmaceutical companies and requests by 
researchers for the same data, on the ground that this was speaker-
identity discrimination. 
Yet it is commonplace for government to distinguish among types of 
speakers in this manner—i.e. based upon their very different occupa-
tional roles, motivations, control over the uses of information, market 
power, institutional commitment to speech values, and so on.  Re-
strictions on attorney speech, for example, do not immediately excite 
strict scrutiny under the First Amendment simply because they are 
 
118 Cf. Frederick Schauer, Principles, Institutions, and the First Amendment, 112 HARV. L. REV. 84, 
113–18 (1998) (arguing that although American free speech doctrine is uncomfortable 
distinguishing among institutions, institutional specificity nevertheless surfaces in cases 
that involve journalists, broadcast media, and education). 
119 This is especially true if one gives a broad definition to speech that is “indispensable to 
decisionmaking in a democracy.”  Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 777; see, e.g., Thomas H. Jackson & 
John Calvin Jeffries, Jr., Commercial Speech:  Economic Due Process and the First Amendment, 65 
VA. L. REV. 1, 18, 30 (1979) (warning that treatment of commercial speech as protected 
speech risks resurrecting economic due process, “clothed in the ill-fitting garb of the 
[F]irst [A]mendment”). 
120 See Robert C. Post, The Constitutional Status of Commercial Speech, 48 UCLA L. REV. 1, 6 
(2000) (“A pharmacist who advertises drug prices is said to engage in commercial speech, 
but the publication of these same prices by Consumer Reports would likely merit full First 
Amendment protection.”); Martin H. Redish, The First Amendment in the Marketplace:  
Commercial Speech and the Values of Free Expression, 39 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 429, 433–34 
(1971) (discussing the importance of First Amendment protection for commercial adver-
tising). 
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aimed solely at lawyers.  On the contrary, the fact that the speaker is a 
lawyer often justifies greater speech restrictions that government can, 
and does, take into account.  Restrictions on public employee speech 
likewise can impose very significant limits, which the Roberts Court 
has emphatically reinforced.121  In fact, all of Pyramid Four is poten-
tially imperiled by the argument that speaker identity-specific speech 
restrictions lead to strict scrutiny, as is much of the terrain below the 
elevated scrutiny line in Pyramid One.  This is a huge potential shake-
up of the free speech landscape. 
If all regulation aimed at a subset of speakers on the same topic is 
“speaker-identity” sensitive and therefore presumptively unconstitu-
tional, then the courts will be very busy indeed determining if all of 
these regulations can satisfy strict scrutiny.  If one replies that this is 
of little concern because all of the regulations will easily pass strict 
scrutiny,122 then one either is assuming that all of this regulation is 
narrowly tailored to advance a compelling government interest in 
ways that meet strict scrutiny—a most dubious assumption—or one is 
willing to dilute strict scrutiny to accommodate this wide range of 
regulations.  Strict in theory may not be fatal in fact;123 but as Justice 
Kennedy himself has said recently, in another context,124 it still needs 
to be strict. 
In the free speech context, true strict scrutiny has been construed 
to set an extremely high bar for the government.125  In fact, Justice 
Kennedy once wrote that in his view, content-based regulation of pro-
tected speech—which triggers strict scrutiny—should never be up-
held.126  Although this is not the law, it comes rather close given how 
 
121 See, e.g., Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410 (2006) (holding that the First Amendment 
does not insulate public employees from employer discipline); see generally supra note 97. 
122 For example, Jane Bambauer argues that expanding the reach of free speech coverage to 
data flow problems will not wreak havoc with the doctrine, and she describes fear that it 
will do so as “far-fetched.”  See Jane Bambauer, Is Data Speech?, 66 STAN. L. REV. 57, 111 
(2014). 
123 Gunther, supra note 103, at 8 (explaining that there is minimal fact and scrutiny in “old” 
equal protection). 
124 Fisher v. Univ. of Tex., 133 S. Ct. 2411, 2421 (2013) (“Strict scrutiny must not be strict in 
theory but feeble in fact.”). 
125 For an especially rigorous display of strict scrutiny analysis in the First Amendment con-
text, see Justice Scalia’s opinion for the Court in Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 
U.S. 765, 783 (2002) (holding that a prohibition promulgated by the Minnesota Supreme 
Court fails strict scrutiny because it is “woefully underinclusive”). 
126 See id. at 793 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“[C]ontent-based speech restrictions that do not 
fall within any traditional exception should be invalidated without inquiry into narrow tai-
loring or compelling government interests.”).  Yet, even Kennedy backed off of this firm 
line when he joined the majority opinion in Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. 
Ct. 2705, 2730–31 (2010) (using a strict scrutiny analysis to conclude that it is not a viola-
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rare it is for the Court to uphold restrictions on speech that qualify 
for full strict scrutiny under current law.127 
Here is my first point:  the Court risks moving too much speech to 
above-the-line, strict scrutiny treatment when it applies a presump-
tion against speaker-identity distinctions that makes considerable 
sense in some contexts to all contexts.  This is a very unwise trend with-
in the current case law that should be halted.  If Citizens United stood 
alone, one might view this concern as overstated.  Given Sorrell, how-
ever, the concern is a real one, with potential tectonic consequences 
for the huge body of below-the-line, or previously loosely scrutinized, 
government regulation of expressive activity. 
B.  The “No New Exceptions” Renovation 
In United States v. Stevens, the Court stated that it would be “star-
tling and dangerous” to create new exceptions to strict scrutiny of 
content-based restrictions on speech based on a “free-floating test for 
First Amendment coverage” that relies upon “an ad hoc balancing of 
relative social costs and benefits.”128  Instead, the content-based re-
strictions, “‘[a]s a general matter,’” must be confined to “‘historic 
and traditional categories long familiar to the bar.’”129  The list of the-
se categories is as follows:  advocacy intended and likely to incite im-
minent lawless action, obscenity, defamation, speech integral to crim-
inal conduct, fighting words, child pornography, fraud, true threats, 
and “speech presenting some grave and imminent threat the gov-
ernment has the power to prevent, although a restriction under the 
last category is most difficult to sustain.”130  It is perhaps significant 
that the Court did not include this last exception in its string of his-
toric and traditional examples in Stevens.  Rather, this example was 
added two years later when the Court applied Stevens in United States 
v. Alvarez.131 
 
tion of the freedom of speech to prohibit citizens from providing material support to ter-
rorist groups). 
127 See id. at 2730 (“[T]his is not to say that any future applications of the material-support 
statute to speech or advocacy will survive First Amendment scrutiny . . . . [W]e in no way 
suggest that a regulation of independent speech would pass constitutional muster, even if 
the Government were to show that such speech benefits foreigh terrorist organizations.”). 
128 130 S. Ct. 1577, 1585 (2010). 
129 Id. at 1584 (quoting Ashcroft v. ACLU, 535 U.S. 564, 573 (2002); Simon & Schuster, Inc. 
v. Members of N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105, 127 (1991) (Kennedy, J., con-
curring)). 
130 United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537, 2544 (2012) (internal citation omitted). 
131 Id. (explaining that content-based speech restrictions include speech presenting threats 
preventable by the Government). 
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In rejecting the argument that new exceptions can be developed 
based on case-by-case balancing, Chief Justice John Roberts noted 
that “[t]he First Amendment itself reflects a judgment by the Ameri-
can people that the benefits of its restrictions on the Government 
outweigh the costs.  Our Constitution forecloses any attempt to revise 
that judgment simply on the basis that some speech is not worth it.”132  
Therefore, the government’s argument that animal “crush videos” 
deserve categorical treatment as low value speech failed.  Depictions 
of animal cruelty are not necessarily “an integral part of conduct in 
violation of a valid criminal statute.”133 
The Chief Justice acknowledged that there may be “some catego-
ries of speech that have been historically unprotected, but have not 
yet been specifically identified or discussed as such in our case law.”134  
But the clear and inflexible rule set forth in Stevens was that a categor-
ical exception must be “historic and traditional.”135  That the Court 
meant what it said in Stevens also is borne out by the Court’s invoca-
tion of this rule in two subsequent cases:  Alvarez136 and Brown v. Enter-
tainment Merchants Asssociation.137  Like depictions of animal cruelty, 
lies about one’s military awards that are not hooked to concrete 
harm138 and violent interactive videos sold to minors without parental 
consent139 do not fall under any traditional and historical exception.  
This in turn means that regulations aimed at such speech, in a con-
tent-specific way, trigger classic strict scrutiny under the First 
Amendment. 
This last absolute rule is arguably not as worrisome as a practical 
matter as the first two; after all, there are many other ways to curb 
even above-the-line speech that falls outside one of the traditional ex-
ceptions.  But the rule plainly is a theoretical disaster.  Why should 
the balancing test the First Amendment allegedly already conducts be 
 
132 Stevens, 130 S. Ct. at 1585. 
133 Id. at 1586 (quoting New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 761–62 (1982) (internal quotation 
marks omitted)); see also id. (distinguishing regulation of child pornography on this ba-
sis). 
134 Id.; see also id. (declining to carve out new categories of speech outside the scope of the 
First Amendment). 
135 Id. at 1584. 
136 132 S. Ct. 2537, 2544 (2012) (finding invalid an act criminalizing false statements, which 
had been made to claim military awards). 
137 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2734 (2011) (extending Stevens to prevent creation of new categories). 
138 See Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. at 2549 (explaining that offensive conduct alone is not sufficient to 
warrant regulation of protected speech). 
139 See Brown, 131 S. Ct. at 2735–36 (2011) (“No doubt a State possesses legitimate power to 
protect children from harm, but that does not include a free-floating power to restrict the 
ideas to which children may be exposed.”) (internal citation omitted). 
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a one-way ratchet?  Does Stevens mean no new exceptions to full First 
Amendment protection for speech that falls above the current line, 
and no more migration of speech from below-the-line to above-the-line status?  
If so, how does the migration of commercial speech from “unprotect-
ed” to protected, under Central Hudson limits, fit this mandate?  For 
that matter, how do we justify robust, modern protection for seditious 
libel?  Or for defamation leveled at a public figure?  If not, then what 
is the role of First Amendment history here—which of course began 
with application solely to the federal government and not to state and 
local governments? 
Why should public employees (and perhaps public school chil-
dren) have any freedom of speech at work (or at school)?  Why ask 
mock questions during oral arguments that press the “original intent” 
point on the ground that the Justice is asking—foolishly—what James 
Madison thought about violent videos?140 
Finally, and more fundamentally, how exactly do we decide if 
speech that falls outside a traditional exception, and is therefore sub-
ject to elevated scrutiny, is “protected speech” without conducting 
case-by-case balancing of the harm of the speech weighed against its 
value?  The self-assured “no new exceptions” language ignores the 
dynamic judicial interpretation process, post-1925, that led to a great-
ly expanded application of the First Amendment—to include regula-
tions of state and local governments via the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment—and a greatly expanded scope of the free-
doms it confers.  It also ignores the basic structure of Pyramid One, 
which shows how much expression currently lies below the line of ele-
vated scrutiny.  If the logic of Stevens holds, then the Pyramid is now 
fossilized.  This may lend some stability to the doctrine; but to bind 
future courts to this close-ended commitment is impossible to square 
with significant swaths of the First Amendment work of the Court pre-
2010. 
Here is my second point:  the Court in Stevens foolishly introduced 
an ostensibly history- and tradition-based hard brake on the categori-
cal exceptions within free speech doctrine without adequately con-
sidering the wider, logical, and normative implications of doing this.  
By strictly cabining the exceptions, it also placed a lot of stress on 
strict scrutiny, just as it did with its line in the sand rule about speak-
er-identity in Sorrell and Citizens United.  This is another potentially 
 
140 See Transcript of Oral Argument at 17, Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729 
(2011) (No. 08-1448) (“[W]hat Justice Scalia wants to know is what James Madison 
thought about video games”); cf. Brown, 131 S. Ct. at 2729 (2011) (holding that video 
games are protected under the First Amendment). 
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significant flaw in the free speech architecture because it allows too 
little room for growth, changed circumstances, and evolving wisdom. 
C.  The Government Speech Renovation 
In Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, the Court held that when the 
government is the speaker, the First Amendment does not apply at 
all, apart from Establishment Clause limits on government speech.141  
In the words of Justice Samuel Alito, “[t]he Free Speech Clause re-
stricts government regulation of private speech; it does not regulate 
government speech.”142  The Court in Summum relied on an earlier 
case involving compelled subsidies for Government advertising mes-
sages, in which the Court stated that the Government’s own speech is 
“exempt from First Amendment scrutiny.”143 
Like the foregoing close-ended statements about speaker-specific 
restrictions on speech and no new exceptions, this absolute statement 
about government speech is either not meant to be as absolute as it 
sounds, or constitutes a very worrisome gap in free speech protection.  
It surely is hard to square with the free speech logic that undergirds 
the prohibition on speaker-identity restrictions:  government infor-
mation is of enormous value to “decision-making in democracy.”  To 
place government power over that information and its presentation 
to the public wholly beyond the First Amendment’s reach is a very 
scary proposition. 
One can readily appreciate the problem of judicial second-
guessing of the millions of value-laden choices that government 
makes daily in the form of speech.144  Yet experience with government 
power over “its” speech, and how it can slide from persuasion to 
propaganda,145 from bully pulpit to billy club, should make us all wary 
of unlimited government power over the vast sea of information that 
the government creates, controls, interprets, and yes—spins. 
The problem goes even deeper into constitutional logic.  The 
Court long ago declared that as a general matter, only government 
 
141 555 U.S. 460, 467–68 (2009); see id. (explaining that government speech must comport 
with the Establishment Clause). 
142 Id. 
143 Johanns v. Livestock Mktg. Ass’n, 544 U.S. 550, 553 (2005). 
144 The problem of judicial capacity as it relates to doctrinal development has been beautiful-
ly explored by Andrew Coan.  See Andrew B. Coan, Judicial Capacity and the Substance of 
Constitutional Law, 122 YALE L.J. 422, 424–58 (2012). 
145 See MAGEDAH E. SHABO, TECHNIQUES OF PROPAGANDA AND PERSUASION 116 (2008) (dis-
cussing the negative uses of propaganda); see also infra note 242. 
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can violate our federal constitutional rights;146 thus, only “state action” 
triggers the First Amendment.  Government restrictions on its own 
speech do not fit neatly into the basic rule that only government action 
that burdens private parties’ liberty mobilizes constitutional liberty 
concerns.147 
Yet just as we know that private parties can exercise frightening, 
channel-choking power over information without governmental par-
ticipation or direct endorsement—think Google148—we know gov-
ernment can exercise similarly scary power without directly regulat-
ing any private party.  To place either actor completely beyond the 
First Amendment may serve constitutional formalist logic, but it also 
leaves us impoverished in ways that are best described as First 
Amendment losses. 
Within state action doctrine, the point is especially vivid in Marsh 
v. Alabama:  even though the private company owned the whole town, 
this did not mean that a Jehovah’s Witness had no constitutional 
right to engage in expressive activity on the streets of that “private 
town.”149  Rather, the Court treated the private company as the gov-
ernment because of its pervasive control over ostensibly municipal 
functions; the private entity, in Marsh, was tantamount to the gov-
ernment because it engaged in a “public function.”150 
Correlatively, freedom of speech doctrine also should include an 
exception to the “government speech” doctrine for the rare circum-
stances in which the government exerts so much expressive power that 
its actions are tantamount to direct speech regulation.  This much 
free speech breathing room is worth preserving, despite the general 
and sensible assumption that government may engage in content- 
and even viewpoint-specific regulation of its own speech, with virtual-
ly no First Amendment brakes.  One factor, though not the only one, 
that should be relevant to determining the contours of this caveat is 
the extent to which government has monopoly power over the in-
 
146 The notable exception is the Thirteenth Amendment.  See U.S. CONST. amend. XIII. 
147 I will set aside here the liberty-based argument in favor of “states’ rights.”  See Bond v. 
United States, 131 S. Ct. 2355, 2360 (2011) (finding that an individual has standing to 
challenge a federal statute’s validity on the grounds that it infringes upon rights reserved 
to states). 
148 See Bambauer, supra note 36, at 919 (recognizing that while Google has great power over 
information, it does not operate in “near governmental fashion” as the company towns 
did in cases such as Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946)); see also Rosen, supra note 36, 
at 69 (describing a future hypothetical feature of Facebook allowing users to track each 
other walking around via live-streaming public “camera networks”). 
149 Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 509 (1946) (explaining that private ownership does not 
preclude access to fundamental liberties unfer the First Amendment). 
150 Id. at 506–09. 
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formation in question.  The lack of options matters.  We might think 
we have a choice of horses, but when Thomas Hobson runs the only 
stable in town, our horse is always the horse that Hobson selects. 
Summum, weirdly, ignores this concern.  I say “weirdly” because 
the Roberts Court has been viewed as exceptionally pro-speech,151 and 
because the more conservative justices in particular worry openly 
about the ways in which government may constrain private choices.  
Consider, for example, how outraged Justice Alito was in Christian Le-
gal Society v. Martinez, where he exclaimed that there is “no freedom 
for expression that offends prevailing standards of political correct-
ness in our country’s institutions of higher learning.”152  Why should 
“political correctness” allegedly inculcated by one set of government 
actors be so outrageous, but not other forms or the same form of “in-
doctrination” performed without direct subsidies or regulation? 
I have no difficulty with the case law that presumes, even in cases 
that involve subsidies to private parties, or direct regulation of their 
behavior, that government usually gets to control its own property, 
funds, and messages.  But even a little splash of legal realism is 
enough to wake us up to how government can achieve its viewpoint-
narrow ends without direct regulation of individuals or conditions on 
grants, simply by speaking stentorianly in its own voice. 
Here is my third point:  Summum moves too much speech categor-
ically below the line, forever.  It is imprudently and unnecessarily abso-
lute, in ways that violate the Court’s own sense of the primary value of 
freedom of expression. 
D.  Summary:  Misunderstanding Doctrine and Theory 
The Court is on the wrong path in these cases.  The tension be-
tween what it says in them, and what it has done elsewhere (and likely 
will do in the future) is completely untenable.  It is too enamored by 
the most aspirational statements about the First Amendment in some 
of them, too willing to substitute aphorisms for analysis in all of them, 
and too reluctant to lift to plain view the balancing test that actually 
informs its choices in any of them. 
 
151 However, these appearances can be deceiving.  See Erwin Chemerinsky, Not a Free Speech 
Court, 53 ARIZ. L. REV. 723, 724–25 (2011) (discussing the Roberts Court rulings against 
free speech claims). 
152 130 S. Ct. 2971, 3000 (2010) (Alito, J., dissenting). 
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On the contrary, it harshly chides litigants who attempt to make 
the doctrinal balance between speech harms and benefits explicit.153  
At the same time, it banishes an entire, extremely powerful category 
of speech to First Amendment irrelevance, with alarmingly little room 
for reconsideration in a future worst-case-scenario. 
Instead, it should have embraced a more pragmatic, incremental-
ist, and methodological approach that better tracks the messy doctri-
nal reality—without sacrificing free speech passion or analytical rigor. 
E.  The Court’s Compelled Speech Cases 
A particularly complex area of free speech law—compelled 
speech—illustrates quite vividly the wisdom of doctrinal pragmatism.  
These cases are a rich, trans-substantive zone of sticky speech regula-
tion dilemmas that trigger bipartisan anxieties about government 
power, and they are an area in which the Roberts Court recently re-
vealed that it can write opinions that are notably and refreshingly 
elastic and realistic. 
In Agency for International Development v. Alliance for Open Society In-
ternational, Inc. (“AID”), Chief Justice Roberts embraced the soaring 
“fixed star” rhetoric of Justice Robert Jackson in West Virginia State 
Board of Education v. Barnette,154 to strike down a condition on a federal 
grant that restricted the free speech of grant recipients.155  Yet it also 
acknowledged the analytical messiness and doctrinal fluidity of the 
compelled speech case law.  In the latter respect, the case was surpris-
ing and—I argue—a turn in the right direction. 
 
1. Agency for International Development v. Alliance for Open Society In-
ternational, Inc. 
 
The Court in AID overturned government conditions on access to 
federal funding that required recipients to adopt a “policy explicitly 
opposing prostitution” and prohibited recipients from engaging in 
any activities inconsistent with an anti-prostitution stance.156  The fed-
 
153 See, e.g., United States v. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. 1577, 1585 (2010) (explaining that the bene-
fits of First Amendment restrictios on the Government outweigh the costs). 
154 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943) (stating that “[i]f there is any fixed star in our constitutional 
constellation, it is that no official . . . can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, na-
tionalism, religion, or other matters of opinion”). 
155 133 S. Ct. 2321, 2332 (2013). 
156 Id. at 2325–32 (striking down the condition on freedom of speech grounds). 
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eral program in question aimed at reducing HIV/AIDS behavioral 
risks, and conditioned funding on two conditions:  first, no funds 
made available to carry out the law “may be used to promote or advo-
cate the legalization or practice of prostitution or sex trafficking”; 
and second, no funds could “provide assistance to any group or or-
ganization that does not have a policy explicitly opposing prostitution 
and sex trafficking.”157  The second condition was the condition that 
was challenged by program fund recipients, who argued that the 
adoption of such a policy would make it more difficult for them to 
work with prostitutes in the fight against HIV/AIDS.158 
The Court in AID set forth the following standard for unconstitu-
tional conditions on funding:  “the relevant distinction . . . is between 
conditions that define the limits of the government spending pro-
gram—those that specify the activities Congress wants to subsidize—
and conditions that seek to leverage funding to regulate speech out-
side the contours of the program itself.”159  It then openly acknowl-
edged that “[t]he line is hardly clear, in part because the definition of a 
particular program can always be manipulated to subsume the challenged 
condition.”160 
In a subsequent passage, the Court admitted (with remarkable 
understatement) that the distinction it has drawn “between condi-
tions that define the federal program and those that reach outside it” 
is “not always self-evident.”161  Chief Justice Roberts invoked Justice Ben-
jamin Cardozo—an intellectual leader of evolutionary or dynamic 
constitutional interpretation adherents162—who said that 
“[d]efinition more precise must abide the wisdom of the future.”163  
Chief Justice Roberts expressed “confiden[ce] that the Policy Re-
quirement [fell] on the unconstitutional side of the line,”164 but sur-
rounded this assurance with apparent humility about judicial capacity 
to impose categorical order on this area of speech doctrine. 
 
157 Id. at 2326 (quoting 22 U.S.C. § 7631(e)–(f)). 
158 Id. 
159 Id. at 2328. 
160 Id. (emphasis added). 
161 Id. at 2330 (emphasis added). 
162 See CARDOZO, supra note 5, at 17 (noting that “[t]he great generalities of the constitution 
have a content and significance that vary from age to age” and outlining the elements of a 
common law method of constitutional decision-making). 
163 Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 591 (1937). 
164 Agency for Int’l Dev., 133 S. Ct. at 2330. 
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The Court distinguished prior conditional funding decisions, such 
as Rust v. Sullivan,165 on the ground that the funding condition in AID 
reached beyond the scope of the funded program.166  The program in 
Rust was defined by Congress up front to encourage only selected 
family planning methods.  The grantees also were not restricted from 
engaging in abortion advocacy outside the scope of the funded pro-
gram; they were only prohibited from engaging in abortion advocacy 
on the funded job.167 
The policy requirement in AID, in contrast, was not merely a se-
lection criterion for grant recipients who would further the pro-
gram’s ends.  This legitimate government goal was already protected 
by the first condition on funding, i.e. that no funds “be used to pro-
mote or advocate the legalization or practice of prostitution or sex 
trafficking.”168  Adding the second condition—requiring adoption of 
a policy against prostitution—took this limit one step further:  it 
compelled grant recipients to affirmatively “adopt—as their own—the 
Government’s view on an issue of public concern” in a way that went 
beyond the scope of the Program.169  This was a restraint on the grantee, 
not the program or service it provided with federal funds.  Chief Jus-
tice Roberts therefore viewed the case as more comparable to FCC v. 
League of Women Voters of California, which struck down a condition on 
federal funding to noncommercial broadcast television and radio sta-
tions that prohibited editorializing, even with private funds.170  That 
condition went beyond assuring that no federal funds went to edito-
rializing; it leveraged the funding to “regulate the stations’ speech 
outside the scope of the program.”171 
In AID, the condition likewise went too far.  Even if the grantee 
had an affiliate that could express the disfavored views, and even 
though a potential grantee could “just say no” to the funds, demand-
ing adoption of the policy as a condition of funding was an impermis-
 
165 500 U.S. 173 (1991); see id. at 195 n.4 (“Congress’ power to allocate funds for public pur-
poses includes an ancillary power to ensure that those funds are properly applied to the 
prescribed use.”). 
166 Agency for Int’l Dev., 133 S. Ct. at 2329–30 (analyzing the Court’s finding in Rust that a 
condition on funding in Title X was not unconstitutional under the First Amendment). 
167 See id. (analyzing Rust). 
168 Id. at 2324, 2326 (quoting The Leadership Act, 22 U.S.C.A. § 7631(e) (West 2008), de-
clared unconstitutional by Agency for Int’l Dev. v. Alliance for Open Soc’y Int’l, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 
2321 (2013)). 
169 Agency for Int’l Dev., 133 S. Ct. at 2330. 
170 468 U.S. 364 (1984). 
171 Agency for Int’l Dev., 133 S. Ct. at 2329 (discussing the Court’s treatment of a condition on 
federal financial assistance in FCC v. League of Women Voters of California, 468 U.S. 364, 399 
(1984)). 
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sible restraint on the grantee’s freedom of expression.172  Unconstitu-
tional conditions on funding are not restricted to situations in which 
a “condition is actually coercive, in the sense of an offer that cannot 
be refused.”173  Rather, the distinction drawn in prior cases is “not so 
limited.”174 
The policy requirement thus went “beyond preventing recipients 
from using private funds in a way that would undermine the federal 
program.  It require[d] them to pledge allegiance to the Government’s 
policy of eradicating prostitution.”175  This was compelled affirmation 
of belief not confined to the scope of the funded government pro-
gram.  In short, impermissible government compulsion comes in 
many forms, and is not limited to cases of actual coercion.  One of 
those forms—but not the only one—is the leveraging of funding to 
regulate speech outside the contours of the program itself. 
2. Doctrinal Backdrop to AID 
The Court in AID invoked the oft-quoted and facially absolutist 
language from Barnette:  “[i]f there is any fixed star in our constitu-
tional constellation, it is that no official, high or petty, can prescribe 
what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other 
matters of opinion or force citizens to confess by word or act their 
faith therein.”176  But the Court acknowledged that the whole First 
Amendment story is hardly consistent with this stirring “no indoctri-
nation” passage.177 
A moment’s reflection on the wide range of circumstances in 
which government can, and does, prescribe what is orthodox in mat-
ters of public opinion and compel individual speech makes clear that 
even this most cherished liberal right to resist orthodoxy bows often to 
democratic reality.  Distinguishing between permissible and imper-
missible government coercion requires nuance and a willingness to 
bend speech principles to accommodate conflicting political, histori-
cal, and other regulatory realities. 
For example, consider the following “compelled speech” scenari-
os: 
 
172 Agency for Int’l Dev., 133 S. Ct. at 2328–30. 
173 Id. at 2328. 
174 Id. 
175 Id. at 2332 (emphasis added). 
176 Id. (quoting W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642, (1943)). 
177 Id. at 2330. 
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 Government requires physicians to offer counseling to terminal-
ly ill patients about available palliative care.178 
 Government conditions Medicare funding on recipients’ com-
pliance with rules regarding disclosure of treatment options to 
patients.179 
 Government requires commercial speech to include “purely fac-
tual and uncontroversial information,” if it is “reasonably relat-
ed to the State’s interest in preventing deception of consum-
ers.”180 
 Government requires that a graphic image be included on to-
bacco product packaging to warn consumers of health dangers 
of smoking.181 
 Government requires that cell phone retailers post certain in-
formational posters developed by the Department of the Envi-
ronment that warn of health dangers of cell phones.182 
 Government requires that doctors warn abortion patients that 
the procedure puts them at “increased risk of suicide ideation 
and suicide.”183 
 Government requires that any organization that provides in-
formation about pregnancy-related services and does not pro-
 
178 N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2997-c(2) (McKinney 2012). 
179 Medicare Condition of Participation:  Patient’s Rights, 42 C.F.R. § 482.13(b) (2010). 
180 Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of the Sup. Ct. of Ohio, 471 U.S. 626, 651 
(1985). 
181 Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act, Pub. L. No. 111-31, § 201.4(d), 123 
Stat. 1776, 1845 (2009).  But see R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Food and Drug Admin., 696 
F.3d 1205, 1222 (D.C. Cir. 2012), overruled by Am. Meat Inst. v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 760 
F.3d 18 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (striking down a rulemaking made pursuant to the Family Smok-
ing Prevention and Tobacco Control Act on compelled speech grounds). 
182 See, e.g., CTIA—The Wireless Ass’n v. City and County of San Francisco, 827 F. Supp. 2d 
1054, 1057 (N.D. Cal. 2011) (upholding requirement that cell phone retailers provide 
consumers with informational fact-sheets prepared by San Francisco Department of the 
Environment regarding potential health effects of cell phone use). 
183 E.g., Planned Parenthood Minnesota, North Dakota, South Dakota v. Rounds, 686 F.3d 
889, 892–94 (8th Cir. 2012) (en banc) (upholding South Dakota law requiring that physi-
cians provide an abortion patient with a written description of medical risks and statisti-
cally significant risk factors of the procedure); cf. Conan v. Walters, 309 F.3d 629 (9th Cir. 
2002) (holding government policy of investigating physicians who recommend use of ma-
rijuana to patients violated free speech of physicians); Stuart v. Loomis, 992 F. Supp. 2d 
585 (M.D.N.C. 2014) (striking down “speech and display” provision that required doctors 
to display ultrasound images and describe them to patient).  See generally Robert C. Post, 
Informed Consent to Abortion:  A First Amendment Analysis of Compelled Physician Speech, 2007 
U. ILL. L. REV. 939, 948 (distinguishing between speech “by a professional” and “profes-
sional speech”). 
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vide information about abortions or certain types of birth con-
trol post a conspicuous sign in the waiting room notifying cli-
ents that it “does not provide or make referral for abortion or 
birth-control services.”184 
 Government bans therapies by mental health providers de-
signed to change minors’ sexual orientations, including efforts 
to “change behaviors or gender expressions, or to eliminate or 
reduce sexual or romantic attractions or feelings toward indi-
viduals of the same sex.”185 
 Government prohibits a web-site owner from posting trade se-
crets on his Internet Website, where he knows or has reason to 
know the secrets were acquired by improper means, i.e. through 
reverse engineering in violation of a license agreement that 
deals with content scrambling technology of DVDs.186 
 Government denies registered student organization status to law 
student organizations that do not comply with an “all-comers” 
anti-discrimination policy.187 
 
184 The Evergreen Ass’n v. City of New York, 740 F.3d 233 (2d Cir. 2014), cert. denied, No. 13-
1462, 2014 WL 2586961 (U.S. Nov. 3, 2014); Greater Baltimore Ctr. for Pregnancy Con-
cerns, Inc. v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 721 F.3d 264, 271 (4th Cir. 2013). 
185 S. 1172, 2011-2012 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2012), available at https://leginfo.legislature.ca.
gov/faces/billNavClient.xhtml?bill_id=201120120SB1172; Pickup v. Brown, 740 F.3d 
1208, 1221–23 (9th Cir. 2013).  See generally Eugene Volokh, Speech as Conduct:  Generally 
Applicable Laws, Illegal Courses of Conduct, “Situation-Altering Utterances,” and the Uncharted 
Zones, 90 CORNELL L. REV. 1277 (2005) (discussing the First Amendment tensions in 
some regulation of professional speech). 
186 DVD Copy Control Ass’n v. Bunner, 75 P.3d 1, 8–10 (Cal. 2003) (upholding a grant of 
injunctive relief under California trade secret laws on ground that the law in question 
served significant state interests, burdened no more speech than necessary to serve these 
interests, and did not contribute significantly to any public debate about use of encryp-
tion software or DVD industry efforts to limit unauthorized copying of DVDs); see also 
Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 532–33 (2001) (addressing the constitutionality of stat-
utes that punish the disclosure of illegally intercepted communications, and distinguish-
ing between matters of public versus purely private concern).  See generally Richard A. Ep-
stein, Privacy, Publication, and the First Amendment:  The Dangers of First Amendment 
Exceptionalism, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1003 (2000) (arguing in favor of common law protection 
of trade secrets); Rodney A. Smolla, Information as Contraband:  The First Amendment and 
Liability for Trafficking in Speech, 96 NW. U. L. REV. 1099 (2002) (analyzing Supreme Court 
cases that address tension between freedom of expression and use of illegally intercepted 
communications). 
187 Christian Legal Soc’y v. Martinez, 561 U.S. 661, 669–73 (2010).  See generally Toni M. Mas-
saro, Christian Legal Society v. Martinez:  Six Frames, 38 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 569 (2011) 
(using the decision in Martinez to analyze the government’s right to condition funds while 
being limited by the sometimes conflicting goals of diversity and freedom of expression). 
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 Government requires all students who attend a public university 
in that state to pay a student-activity fee, which supports a range 
of student organizations.188 
 Government requires colleges and universities that receive fed-
eral funding to allow military recruiters onto their campuses on 
same terms as recruiters for other employers.189 
 Government applies anti-fraud laws to religious actors seeking 
financial contributions.190 
 Government requires individuals who sign ballot proposition 
petitions to reveal their identity.191 
 Government requires public high school students to wear ID 
badges, which include photos and names of the students, bar-
codes tied to students’ social security numbers, and radio fre-
quency identification chips that pinpoint the exact location of 
the individual students, including after school.192 
 Government requires a public middle school student to reveal 
her Facebook password after posting a message about an adult 
hall monitor at her school.193 
 Government requires individuals who engage in door-to-door 
solicitation to first register with the local authorities and obtain 
an identification badge.194 
 Government bans the sale or disclosure by pharmacies of in-
formation regarding the prescribing habits of doctors when the 
information would be used for marketing purposes by pharma-
ceutical manufacturers.195 
 
188 See, e.g., Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Wis. Sys. v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217, 221 (2000) 
(upholding student activity fee to facilitate extracurricular speech, provided the program 
was viewpoint neutral and neutrally applied). 
189 Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic and Institutional Rights, 547 U.S. 47, 59–60 (2006) 
(upholding a conditional spending requirement mandating that law schools who receive 
certain federal funds afford equal access to military recruiters). 
190 United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 79 (1944). 
191 See, e.g., John Doe No. 1 v. Reed, 561 U.S. 186, 190–91 (2011) (upholding Washington 
state public records disclosure law, on facial challenge). 
192 See, e.g., A.H. v. Northside Indep. Sch. Dist., 916 F. Supp. 2d 757, 761–62 (W.D. Tex. 
2013). 
193 E.g., R.S. v. Minnewaska Area Sch. Dist., 894 F. Supp. 2d 1128, 1133–34 (D. Minn. 2012). 
194 See, e.g., Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc’y of New York, Inc. v. Vill. of Stratton, 536 U.S. 
150, 154–56 (2002). 
195 Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653, 2659 (2011). 
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 Government imposes criminal sanctions for the promotion by a 
drug salesperson of an FDA-approved prescription drug for “off-
label” uses.196 
 Government bans physicians from prescribing an FDA-approved 
drug, except in the dosage and manner prescribed by the FDA 
in 2000.197 
 Government requires private parties to subsidize an advertising 
campaign for certain agricultural products.198 
 Government requires public employees to pay an annual fee to 
cover the costs of the union’s collective bargaining activities, but 
allows dissenting nonmembers of the union to affirmatively ob-
ject to dues deductions used for political activities rather than 
requiring that all nonmembers opt in to this use of union 
dues.199 
 Government requires individuals arrested for serious crimes to 
produce a DNA sample200 
 Government requires commercial photographers that operate 
places of public accommodation to respect non-discrimination 
laws that prohibit discrimination based on sexual orientation.201 
 
196 See, e.g., United States v. Caronia, 703 F.3d 149, 168–69 (2d Cir. 2012); Michelle M. Mello 
et al., Shifting Terrain in the Regulation of Off-Label Promotion of Pharmaceuticals, 360 NEW 
ENG. J. MEDICINE 1557, 1561 (2009), available at http://www.hsph.harvard.edu/michelle-
mello/files/2012/10/Off-label_PDF.pdf. 
197 See, e.g., Okla. Coal. for Reprod. Justice v. Cline, 292 P.3d 27, 27–28 (Okla. 2012) (per 
curiam) (citing Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 
(1992) to hold that a statute, which prohibited the reckless or knowing prescription of 
abortifacient medication, was facially unconstitutional). 
198 Compare Glickman v. Wileman Bros. & Elliott, Inc., 521 U.S. 457, 477 (1997) (upholding 
federal marketing program that subsidized ad campaign for California fruit), with United 
States v. United Foods, Inc., 533 U.S. 405, 413 (2001) (striking down compelled subsidiza-
tion of advertising program aimed at promoting mushrooms).  See generally Johanns v. 
Livestock Mktg. Ass’n, 544 U.S. 550, 562 (2005) (upholding a requirement that cattle 
producers subsidize ads for beef, on the ground that this was “government speech,” not 
private expression). 
199 Knox v. Serv. Emps. Int’l Union, Local 1000, 132 S. Ct. 2277, 2295 (2012) (holding that 
there must be an opt-in, not merely opt-out, mechanism for distributing dues deductions 
from wages of non-union members to union political activities); cf. Harris v. Quinn, 134 S. 
Ct. 2618 (2014) (holding First Amendment prohibited collection of an agency fee from 
“partial public employee” home health care workers). 
200 Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct. 1958, 1980 (2013). 
201 Elane Photography, LLC v. Willock, 309 P.3d 53, 59 (N.M. 2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 
1787 (2014) (holding a commercial photography business could not refuse to photo-
graph same-sex commitment ceremony based on personal religious objections to same-
sex marriage). 
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In all of the above cases, and in countless more,202 the government is 
actively involved in shaping, prohibiting, or outright compelling 
speech.  Predicting when a court will conclude that the scenario 
crosses the First Amendment line is extremely difficult, even if one 
knows the doctrinal results in all of the above examples. 
This is all entirely unsurprising, given the Janus-faced principles 
that the Court has invoked in compelled speech cases. 
On the one hand, the Court has said that “the right of freedom of 
thought . . . includes both the right to speak freely and the right to 
refrain from speaking at all.”203  It also has upheld the right not to 
disclose one’s identity, in some contexts, as part of this right to re-
frain from speaking.204  Yet it has upheld numerous demands that 
speakers disclose their identity205 when this is necessary to protect 
consumers, the integrity of electoral processes, or other important 
government objectives. 
 
202 See, e.g., Wollschlaeger v. Farmer, 814 F. Supp. 2d 1367 (S.D. Fla. 2011) (striking down on 
free speech grounds Florida’s “Firearm Owners’ Privacy Act,” which forbade doctors from 
including information about patients’ firearm ownership in medical records, asking pa-
tients whether they own firearms, unless relevant to patients’ medical care, or discriminat-
ing against patients because they own a firearm), rev’d, Wollschlaeger v. Florida, 760 F.3d 
1195 (11th Cir. 2014). 
   The complexities of mandatory disclosures and disclaimers in the context of cam-
paign finance and electoral process cases are beyond the scope of this article but are 
clearly relevant to the more general question of whether government can compel expres-
sion.  See infra notes 204–05.  The problem is also pervasive within the area of constitu-
tional limits on public employee discipline.  See generally Paul M. Secunda, The (Neglected) 
Importance of Being Lawrence:  The Constitutionalization of Public Employee Rights to Decisional 
Non-Interference in Private Affairs, 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 85 (2006) (discussing the unconsti-
tutional conditions doctrine in the context of public employment).  A rapidly emerging 
free speech conundrum lies ahead for the Securities Exchange Commission, among oth-
er agencies, which is facing First Amendment challenges of some of its disclosure re-
gimes.  See Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs. v. S.E.C., 748 F.3d 359, 364 (D.C. Cir. 2014), overruled by 
Am. Meat Inst. v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 760 F.3d 18 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (invalidating a re-
quirement that companies use specific language when regulated entities declare that 
their products “have not been found to be DRC conflict free,” on compelled speech 
grounds); cf. Am. Meat Inst. v. USDA, 760 F.3d 18 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (affirming lower court 
order that the industry is unlikely to succeed on free speech claims, and objecting to fed-
eral country-of-origin labeling requirements for “muscle cuts” of meats). 
201 Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 714 (1977) (citation omitted). 
202 See Buckley v. Am. Constitutional Law Found., Inc., 525 U.S. 182 (1999) (holding a re-
quirement that initiative-petition circulators wear identification badges unconstitutional); 
McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334 (1995) (holding a prohibition on dis-
tribution of anonymous campaign literature unconstitutional); Talley v. California, 362 
U.S. 60 (1960) (holding a ban on anonymous handbills unconstitutional); see also Watch-
tower Bible & Tract Soc’y of N.Y., Inc. v. Vill. of Scranton, 536 U.S. 150, 166–67 (2002) 
(holding a village ordinance prohibiting canvassers from going in and on private residen-
tial property too broad and thus unconstitutional). 
203 See, e.g., Doe v. Reed, 561 U.S. 186 (2010) (holding that a state requirement that petition 
signers disclose their identities constitutional). 
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On the one hand, the Court has stated that “First Amendment 
values are at serious risk if the government can compel a particular 
citizen, or discrete group of citizens, to pay special subsidies for 
speech on the side that it favors.”206  Yet it has upheld requirements 
that effectively compel expression through mandatory assessments 
for government sponsored ad campaigns,207 on the ground that the 
assessments were “ancillary to a more comprehensive program re-
stricting marketing autonomy.”208 
On the one hand, the Court has said that conditioning a govern-
ment benefit on forgoing speech is “in effect to penalize them for 
such speech.”209  Yet it has said that a mere refusal to fund speech is 
not a burden on expression where there is “no indication that the 
statute was intended to suppress any ideas or any demonstration that 
it has had that effect.”210  Put another way, “[g]overnment 
can . . . selectively fund a program to encourage certain activities it 
believes to be in the public interest, without at the same time funding 
an alternative program which seeks to deal with the problem in an-
other way.”211 
In fact, in most cases, the “just turn down the money” response to 
claims that conditions on benefits are coercive proves to be disposi-
tive.  But there are exceptions, as AID and other cases prove. 
The Court’s “yes, but” doctrinal statements have led to important 
critiques, many on the ground that the outcome in the specific case 
cannot be squared with outcomes in other cases, which in turn often 
leads to indictments of the entire area of law as unprincipled.212  This 
lack of order, though, is unremarkable when one realizes that the 
compelled speech problem is but one piece of the larger and intrac-
table  “unconstitutional conditions” conundrum. 
Nor is the right answer “more formalism” or stricter tests to con-
strain judicial balancing—as tempting as that may be.  Even the most 
heroic efforts of scholars to assist judges in forging one clear path 
 
204 United States v. United Foods, Inc., 533 U.S. 405, 411 (2001). 
205 Glickman v. Wileman Bros. & Elliott, 521 U.S. 457 (1997) (holding that assessments for 
generic advertising do not amount to a restriction of free speech). 
206 United Foods, 533 U.S. at 411–12 (distinguishing Glickman). 
207 Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 518 (1958). 
208 Regan v. Taxation With Representation of Washington, 461 U.S. 540, 548 (1983). 
209 Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 193 (1991). 
210 See, e.g., Robert Post, Transparent and Efficient Markets:  Compelled Commercial Speech and Co-
erced Commercial Association in United Foods, Zauderer, and Abood, 40 VAL. U. L. REV. 555, 
557–58 (2006) (critiquing case law on compelled commercial speech). 
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through this constitutional thicket have failed, and no theorist drawn 
to these seductive rocks has survived unbruised.213 
A primary reason for the muddle is that there are “Unconstitu-
tional Conditions Questions Everywhere.”214  As Fred Schauer has ob-
served, “what looks like an unconstitutional condition from one angle 
may look strikingly like government speech, or government support 
of its own activities and policies, from another.”215  This makes recon-
ciling the cases “too hard,” and the search for consistency a “chime-
ra.”216  There also are compelled speech questions everywhere, and the 
search for consistency among them is likewise a chimera.  What looks 
like compelled speech from one angle may look strikingly like gov-
ernment speech, or government regulation of conduct, or promotion 
of sensible government regulatory policy, from another.  Even the 
famous Holmes adage that one cannot cry fire falsely in a crowded 
theater is a form of compelled speech insofar as compelled silence is 
viewed as a burden on expressive autonomy.  Moreover, stare deci-
sis—among other factors—operates as a huge constraint on analytical 
purity. 
Regulation aimed at professional or expert expression nicely illus-
trates these points:  when do these regulations permissibly require a 
person to curb or shape his or her professional or expert speech to 
conform to professional standards, versus impermissibly “affirm ideo-
logical truths to which they might well object”?217  This in turn, of 
course, begs another question:  well, when are professional standards 
themselves unduly “ideological?” 
 
211 For especially influential efforts to make sense of the doctrine, see Lynn A. Baker, The 
Prices of Rights:  Toward a Positive Theory of Unconstitutional Conditions, 75 CORNELL L. REV. 
1185, 1216–20 (1990); Richard A. Epstein, Foreword:  Unconstitutional Conditions, State Pow-
er, and the Limits of Consent, 102 HARV. L. REV. 4, 26–28 (1988); Seth F. Kreimer, Allocation-
al Sanctions:  The Problem of Negative Rights In A Positive State, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 1293, 1378–
95 (1984); Robert M. O’Neil, Unconstitutional Conditions:  Welfare Benefits With Strings At-
tached, 54 CALIF. L. REV. 443, 444 (1966); Kathleen M. Sullivan, Unconstitutional Conditions, 
102 HARV. L. REV. 1413, 1499–1505 (1989).  For more pointed skepticism about the doc-
trine itself, see Cass R. Sunstein, Why the Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine Is an Anachro-
nism (With Particular Reference to Religion, Speech, and Abortion), 70 B.U. L. REV. 593, 595–608 
(1990); Cass R. Sunstein, Is There an Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine?, 26 SAN DIEGO L. 
REV. 337, 339–42 (1989). 
212 Adam B. Cox & Adam M. Samaha, Unconstitutional Conditions Questions Everywhere:  The 
Implications of Exit and Sorting for Constitutional Law and Theory, 5 J. OF LEGAL ANALYSIS 61, 
(2012), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2186423 (discussing exit and sorting dy-
namics in constitutional litigation). 
213 Schauer, supra note 118, at 102. 
214 Frederick Schauer, Too Hard:  Unconstitutional Conditions and the Chimera of Constitutional 
Consistency, 72 DENV. U. L. REV. 989 (1995) (exploring views of constitutional ontology). 
215 Post, supra note 183, at 959. 
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The questions quickly turn Escher-like.  When can a professional 
regulatory body claim that there is sufficient scientific or other evi-
dence to justify the compelled speech?  Which is to say, when is the 
regulation not promoted by a desire to suppress knowledge?  Are there 
ever speech-suppressive measures that may not also suppress 
knowledge?  If so, how do we square such measures with the First 
Amendment assumptions that there is no such thing as a false idea, 
that the best remedy for bad speech is counter speech (if there be 
time), or that we should just avert our eyes in the face of bad speech?  
How do we reconcile such a conclusion or justification for speech 
regulation—content– and speaker-specific regulation at that!—with 
the First Amendment’s underlying commitment to an ever-evolving 
construction of “truth,” including truth as it relates to professional 
standards?  Why not just say instead that one man’s quackery is an-
other’s sound medical treatment? 
Courts may draw a line between speech by a professional and pro-
fessional speech to help understand the doctrinal decisions about the 
line between free speech and permissible professional regulation that 
we already have.  Speech by a psychotherapist in her office is differ-
ent from speech on the same topic by the psychotherapist on the 
street corner.  But this does not solve the problem of free speech lim-
its within the former context, and it does not explain what the precise 
First Amendment differences between the two contexts should be.218 
F.  Common Factors, Common Questions? 
Navigating this thicket requires a compass, not a map.  It also re-
quires a healthy respect for paradox within constitutional law.  Yet, 
although the cases are gnarly, courts do ask common questions that in-
form their hard choices. 
 
216 The free speech lines become even muddier when the person is a minister or other reli-
gious official, who may be providing counseling that will have as great of an impact on the 
person being counseled as would a psychotherapist.  There are independent, constitu-
tional reasons why ordinary malpractice rules do not apply to religious officials who en-
gage in mental health “quackery,” but they are not obviously free speech, versus freedom 
of religion, lines.  In fact, affording religious speakers greater speech protection than 
non-religious speakers should excite concern about speaker-identity discrimination, if 
viewed through the free speech lens alone.  A related problem of religious speaker excep-
tionalism surfaces in consumer fraud scenarios, where courts struggle to balance religious 
freedoms with consumer protection laws.  See, e.g., United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78 
(1944); see also Bernadette Meyler, Commerce in Religion, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 887, 898–
901 (2009) (discussing Ballard and the insulation of some commercial religious speech 
from typical fraud rules).  This problem is sure to get even gnarlier, post Burwell v. Hobby 
Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014), which extended Religious Freedom Restoration 
Act coverage to for-profit businesses. 
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Within the vast terrain covered by the “compelled speech” prob-
lem and the often conflicting first principles and contextual caveats, 
several common factors and questions surface throughout the doc-
trine.  Each falls on a continuum, with government power to require 
the expression stronger on the left side than on the right side of the 
continuum. 
 
Toward Government Power Against Government Power 
Idenity-only disclosure More detailed information dis-
closure 
Selectively disclosed information Secret-to-all information 
Public Information Private information 
Memorialized data production Affirmative oral recitation of 
government script 
Expert technical information Non-expert, non-technical in-
formation 
Objective content Subjective content 
Secular content Religious content 
Factual information Ideological information 
Information that can be detected 
in the speaker 
Information that must be ex-
tracted from the speaker 
Compelled silence  Compelled expression 
Government as an option Government monopolization 
Conditions of participation in a 
government program 
General prohibitions beyond the 
scope of the government pro-
gram 
Consistent with the normal func-
tioning of the speaker 
A distortion of the normal func-
tioning of the speaker 
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Proportional to the scope of the 
program 
Beyond the program conditions 
Prevention of direct harms to 
third parties 
Indirect or diffuse harms to oth-
ers 
Prevention of physical harms Cognitive effects 
Government objective of persua-
sion 
Government objective of inculca-
tion 
Choice-facilitating government 
objective 
Choice-narrowing government 
objective 
Controlled government setting “Street corner” setting 
Public accommodation regula-
tion 
Private setting regulation 
Neutrally applied regulation Selectively applied regulation 
Expressive conduct Pure speech 
Traditional area of government 
regulation 
Novel area of government regula-
tion 
Commercial speaker Non-commercial speaker 
Minor speaker Adult speaker 
Government’s own speech Individual speech 
 
These factors,219 rather than bright line tests or stirring quotations 
from Barnette, therefore best describe the extant case law on com-
pelled speech.  They also show why efforts to capture all of them with-
in one non-permeable, theoretical membrane falter.  Even if one 
could explain the left side of the list as a normatively coherent set of 
concerns, the right side must be squared with that account.  Moreo-
ver, we obviously may disagree about whether some expression falls 
 
219 The list is non-exhaustive. 
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on the left versus right side of the line in many cases.  Debates about 
“informed consent” in abortion cases or about the limits of non-
discrimination laws, for example, illustrate how slippery the “ideolog-
ical versus factual” distinction can be.  Consequently, the best answer 
to the question of whether government constitutionally can “compel 
our allegiance” is neither unitary nor unequivocal:  “[i]t depends.” 
As a normative matter, of course, where we draw the line between 
impermissible and permissible compulsion matters greatly.  Paternal-
ism rankles.  We value autonomous decision making, fear govern-
ment overreaching, and exalt notions of democratic processes prem-
ised on an engaged and competent citizenry, even if they are myths.220  
We are not—at least not ideally or theoretically—government sock 
puppets.221  The left line shows this, and calls to mind the factors that 
inspire our greatest liberalism-based concerns about government 
power to compromise these norms.  The conventional theories that 
support freedom of expression all play a role in the left-line emphasis 
on skepticism about compelled speech, though none by itself cap-
tures all of them or—and this matters—their limits. 
But the right side reminds us that we also are government, which 
means we can be conscripted into making government work effective-
ly through us, in various roles that are sometimes heavily regulated.  It 
also reminds us that there are competing speech-based values in most 
freedom of speech conversations, and that restricting a speaker’s 
freedom sometimes will enhance the audience or future speaker’s 
understanding.  We therefore often accept right-side limits on speak-
er autonomy without First Amendment grumbling, even without First 
Amendment notice, and even with First Amendment enthusiasm. 
Finally, the right line cautions us about viewing social problems 
with only a free speech lens in hand.  The practical upshot of the 
competing tugs is the doctrine we have, with its common questions 
but also its complex and at times internally contradictory answers. 
1. Back to AID 
Contrast the inflexibility of the three Roberts Court rules cri-
tiqued in Part I—speaker-identity distinctions always trigger elevated 
scrutiny, no new categorical exceptions, and no free speech limits on 
 
220 See ILYA SOMIN, DEMOCRACY AND POLITICAL IGNORANCE:  WHY SMALLER GOVERNMENT IS 
SMARTER 17–37 (2013), for a recent, chilling account of how ignorant we are. 
221 My colleague Derek Bambauer’s delightful phrase. 
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government speech—with the majority opinion in Agency for Interna-
tional Development v. Alliance for Open Society International.222 
True, the Court began its opinion with hornbook, hard-to-take-
completely-seriously, law:  “[i]t is . . . a basic First Amendment princi-
ple that ‘freedom of speech prohibits the government from telling 
people what they must say.’”223  As we have seen, this is just not true in 
many circumstances. 
But the Court also recognized that a direct prohibition on speech 
is very different from government funding conditioned on compli-
ance with specific, value-laden limits on the use of the funds.224  In 
general, a party who objects to the conditions can merely refuse to 
accept the government funds.  When a party has a choice, however 
constrained, it is much harder to claim that its speech is compelled by 
the government. 
Most importantly, the Court in AID recognized that the constitu-
tional matter is not so black-and-white.  AID set forth one factor for 
determining when conditions on funding cross the free speech line, 
i.e. conditions that restrict a grantee off the funded job, rather than 
merely assuring government funds are spent for program purposes 
only.225  The Court also admitted that the factor is potentially manipu-
lable, and then offered several reasons why it believed that the factor 
pointed toward unconstitutionality.226  It rejected the dissent’s more 
restrictive and formalistic interpretation of precedent, and left open 
to future cases the task of making the standard more precise.227  The 
opinion openly confessed that the standard is hardly one that leads to 
self-evident line-drawing.228  It then firmly placed this case on one side 
of the line. 
But it did so in a very narrow context:  the government already had 
imposed viewpoint-specific limits on use of its funds.  What govern-
ment could not do was carry that one step further and require the re-
cipient to adopt a policy pledging its commitment to the viewpoint-
specific policy the government favors.  How this requirement will play 
out in future cases—such as speech-based challenges to government 
requirements that recipients of funding or commercial actors comply 
 
222 133 S. Ct. 2321 (2013). 
223 Id. at 2327 (quoting Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic and Institutional Rights, Inc., 547 
U.S. 47, 61 (2006)). 
224 Id. at 2328. 
225 Id. at 2329–30. 
226 Id. at 2330. 
227 Id. 
228 Id. 
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with nondiscrimination policies that prohibit discrimination based on 
sexual orientation—remains to be seen. 
One can argue that the opinion is still woefully thin on clear 
markers for future cases.  One can disagree about where the Court 
drew the line in this case.  One surely can debate whether the distinc-
tion drawn between the facts of this case and those in Rust was per-
suasive.229  One also can object to some of the misleadingly absolute 
statements dotting the opinion that celebrate the allegedly clear pro-
hibition of government compulsion of speech. 
But the caveat-laced opinion, taken as a whole, is remarkably 
pragmatic—a very welcome departure from the self-assured sermoniz-
ing of other Roberts Court First Amendment cases.  Moreover, the 
case “goes small” in terms of its potential clear application in future 
cases.  It emphasizes a question to ask—does a funding scheme (ver-
sus a direct prohibition—see Factors 7, 8 and 9 above) unnecessarily 
force applicants to “pledge allegiance” in ways that go beyond the 
funded job? (see Factor 13 above, on proportionality)—but leaves 
open many ways for courts to answer this question. 
To this provisional, hedged, and doctrinally conservative aspect of 
the opinion I say, “Bravo!” and “Encore, please!”  This aspect of the 
case shows a much deeper understanding freedom of expression than 
earlier Roberts Court cases that repress virtually all nuance and po-
tentially hamstring government regulators seeking to limit or pro-
scribe harmful expression in ways that make sound, contemporary 
sense. 
2.  A Word About New Science Implications 
 Factors, rather than formalism, also will enable the Court to better 
adapt to emerging science that is potentially relevant to First 
Amendment thinking.  In particular, the Court will need to consider 
growing evidence of how weak our cognitive abilities may be, how 
disengaged some of us are from democratic deliberations, and how 
technological advances may undermine any robust sense of our ana-
lytical autonomy.  No matter what theory of freedom of speech one 
embraces, the scientific and social science literature presents some 
very serious challenges to fundamental assumptions on which the 
most widely accepted theories are based. 
We have long recognized the unicorn nature of a robust market-
place of ideas that operates as a crucible that leaves “truth” as a resi-
 
229 I do not think it was, but no matter here. 
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due.230  We also long ago categorized as mythical another creature in 
the freedom of speech forest:  the rational autonomous thinker.231  But 
we nevertheless have found it extremely difficult to abandon either 
myth completely. 
Holding on to the rational thinker myth is rapidly getting harder.  
New literature is displaying just how poorly we reason, in fairly pre-
dictable ways, with worrisome implications for First Amendment doc-
trine and theory.232  The literature shows how we can be moved—
suckered—into choices that are not in our best interests due to cog-
nitive weaknesses that make us extremely vulnerable to manipulation.  
Moreover, these works are not political screeds but socio-biological, 
neurological, and psychological investigations into human cognition 
and behavior.  They are attempts to know us as we are, not as we 
would like to imagine ourselves.  They have implications for legal 
norms and principles, but they did not arise in that political value-
laden context with particular policy axes to grind. 
How should we reconcile the traditional freedom of speech tri-
umphalism about individual capacity for reasoning with the emerging 
evidence about human beings’ undeniable susceptibility to bad, mis-
leading, or ideologically tilted messages, often with no awareness or 
concern that we are being led astray?  Rather obvious is that the 
worse we are at thinking, the harder it becomes to treat us as auton-
omous, to reject as “paternalistic” measures that help guide us, or to 
insulate us from influences that are in many ways—even in good 
ways—“coercive.”  Also, if social science studies indicate that we are 
not seeking enlightenment from the marketplace of ideas, as much 
 
230 See, e.g., Baker, supra note 77, at 965–66 (discussing problem with marketplace model 
posed by lazy thinkers in the audience for speech); Derek E. Bambauer, Shopping Badly:  
Cognitive Biases, Communications, and the Fallacy of the Marketplace of Ideas, 77 U. COLO. L. 
REV. 649, 651 (2006) (critiquing the marketplace model on grounds of the many cogni-
tive biases that undermine its assumptions); Owen M. Fiss, State Activism and State Censor-
ship, 100 YALE L.J. 2087 (1991) (discussing market dysfunctions and possible benign 
speech effects of government regulation); Stanley Ingber, The Marketplace of Ideas:  A Legit-
imizing Myth, 1984 DUKE L.J. 1 (critiquing the metaphor on grounds that truth is not a 
natural upshot of the speech market); Sheena S. Iyengar & Mark R. Lepper, When Choice 
Is Demotivating:  Can One Desire Too Much of a Good Thing?, 79 J. PERSONALITY AND SOC. 
PSYCHOL., 995, 996–97 (2000) (discussing how multiple choices can create effects that 
can paralyze rather than liberate decision making); Troy A. Paredes, Blinded By the Light:  
Information Overload and Its Consequences for Securities Regulation, 81 WASH. U. L.Q. 417, 
456–57 (2003) (discussing the difficulties even experts have in sorting out information in 
the relevant marketplace of ideas). 
231 This is a recurring theme in Critical Legal Studies work.  See, e.g., MARK KELMAN, A GUIDE 
TO CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES (1987); ROBERTO MANGABEIRA UNGER, THE CRITICAL LEGAL 
STUDIES MOVEMENT (1983). 
232 See infra text accompanying notes 237–42. 
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free speech theory supposes, but rather mere distraction and often 
crass entertainment,233 then we not only are cognitively weak thinkers, 
but we are also not even trying to be careful thinkers in many of our 
protected expression pursuits. 
Lofty claims about free thinking and oppressive government thus 
are in potentially fatal tension with more realistic appraisals of the av-
erage First Amendment actor and her limited capacity to sort 
through data flow, commercial speech, political messages, entertain-
ment, and other expression that receives the significant First 
Amendment protection. 
Even a quick peek into the burgeoning psychological and neuro-
biological literature on our many cognitive weaknesses, our suscepti-
bility to seductive or selective presentation of information, and the 
countless ways in which we can be “indoctrinated,” “coerced,” or 
“tricked” into bending ourselves to viewpoints that the government 
(among others) seeks to influence makes casual claims about our 
right to be free from government compulsion seem quaint.  At the same 
time, it may make government interventions designed to nudge us 
toward government-favored choices more worrisome. 
For example, the literature arguably makes objections to govern-
ment regulation aimed at guiding us through our “marketplace of 
ideas” choices weaker:  we need far more help than we might imag-
ine.  It also suggests that our resistance (some might say impervious-
ness) to abstract and statistical messages—however accurate they may 
be—and our responsiveness to (some might say seduction by) vivid 
and salient messages means government interventions need to lay it 
on really thick, simple, and visual to even get our attention. 
Thus, very graphic warnings on cigarette packages may be neces-
sary, not unduly paternalistic, if we are serious about deterring people 
from smoking.234  Mere disclosures of the calorie content of a Big Mac 
may not suffice to combat the growing health crisis of obesity.  We 
may instead need a picture of a blind, Type II, diabetic person with a 
leg amputation or severe neuropathy.  Or, we may need some other 
prompt to steer us to healthier choices.  First Amendment doctrine 
thus may need to arc its compelled speech thinking to meet specific 
 
233 See, e.g., Collins & Skover, supra note 91, at 785 (“TV is the talk of our times . . . .”); Toni 
M. Massaro & Robin Stryker, Freedom of Speech, Liberal Democracy, and Emerging Evidence on 
Civility and Effective Democratic Engagement, 54 ARIZ. L. REV. 375, 404–06 (2012) (noting, for 
example, the popular observation that “we live in a vulgar world—one in which modern 
mass media shifted our taste norms . . . .”). 
234 See supra text accompanying note 181; see also Nadia N. Sawicki, Compelling Images:  The 
Constitutionality of Emotionally Persuasive Health Campaigns, 73 MD. L. REV. 458 (2014). 
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problems, rather than intoning stale general formulas about pater-
nalism that may block worthy and life-saving regulation. 
Yet it also suggests that some government use of graphic images to 
nudge us into government-endorsed behaviors may work exceptional-
ly well, with implications for government speech that veers into prop-
aganda or more purely ideological messaging of other kinds.  Alter-
natively, government interventions could boomerang and produce 
consequences that undermine government goals.  The most we likely 
can say is that free speech thinkers ought to consider this emerging 
science, and assess both how it relates to our constitutional frame-
work and how doctrine should be applied to specific speech prob-
lems. 
In some ways, this newer work is simply a more sophisticated ver-
sion of earlier work and case law that already recognized the ways in 
which we think poorly, especially under stress.  The slow march from 
treating criminal syndicalism laws deferentially to demanding a very 
high level of threat before verbal incitement to illegal activity can be 
punished “consciously or not, recognized the risk that highly emo-
tional times of political emergency are likely to evoke the kinds of 
cognitive illusions that lead people to overestimate perceived risks.”235  
Likewise, the lukewarm protection of commercial speech is premised 
in part on the recognition that consumers are “subject to pervasive 
cognitive illusions.”236  In other words, the notion that we are poor 
thinkers, or that we are more socially constructed than autonomous is 
hardly news. 
What has changed is that the scholarly investigation into the pat-
terns within our cognitive illusions is becoming much more sophisti-
cated.  Scholars are starting to explain more precisely how, when, and 
where we are thrown off, with important implications for regulators 
seeking to protect us and judges seeking to protect us from overzeal-
ous government regulators.  Finally, scholars are noticing the norma-
tive (and thus theoretical) implications of these observations, in the 
free speech arena and elsewhere. 
Simply put, the more we know about the human brain and human 
behaviors, the more we may need to adjust the law that applies to 
them.  First Amendment law is one such area, though it is hardly the 
only one.237 
 
235 Paul Horwitz, Free Speech as Risk Analysis:  Heuristics, Biases, and Institutions in the First 
Amendment, 76 TEMP. L. REV. 1, 36 (2003). 
236 Id. at 49;  see also Bambauer, supra note 230. 
237 See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Empirically Informed Regulation, 78 U. CHI. L. REV. 1349 (2011). 
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This may not mean new government mandates are the right an-
swer.  In some cases, regulation may be the wrong answer, because it 
may produce worse outcomes.  It does mean that we should take the 
mandate option seriously.  The multiple, systematic errors that hu-
mans tend to make in thinking about problems clearly relate to fed-
eral regulatory approaches that are designed, per Executive Order 
13563, to “reduce burdens and maintain flexibility and freedom of 
choice for the public.”238 
If we know that humans rely on default rules, engage in procrasti-
nation, use framing devices to process information, are more inclined 
to avoid loss than is reasonable, are vulnerable to social influences, 
suffer from baseless optimism, use unnuanced heuristics, and let 
emotions skew decision making,239 then how should government re-
spond?  If we have an aversion (or imperviousness) to abstract and 
statistical presentations, as opposed to vivid imagery,240 this may affect 
whether and how government should “compel speech”—for exam-
ple, by forcing companies to make particular types of disclosures to 
credit card applicants, health care consumers, and others.241  In other 
words, a lot hinges on whether and where we really are good at think-
ing—as much free speech rhetoric assumes—though one of our cog-
nitive biases seems to be an exaggerated sense that we are good at 
thinking, or at least much better than average. 
In the First Amendment context, these insights corrode the base-
line.  Ignorance may not be bliss; it may be quite injurious to our 
physical health, financial security, political stability, civil liberties, and 
our well-being more generally.  Again, this does not answer whether gov-
ernment regulation of a particular form is better than leaving us to our own, 
muddled-thinking devices.  Our acute vulnerability to framing and heu-
ristics, for example, can be manipulated and abused by government 
as well as by MasterCard.242  It does counsel caution about close-ended 
 
238 Exec. Order No. 13563, 3 C.F.R. 215, 216 (2011). 
239 Id.; see also DAN ARIELY, PREDICTABLY IRRATIONAL (2009); DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING 
FAST AND SLOW (2011); ROBERT TRIVERS, THE FOLLY OF FOOLS:  THE LOGIC OF DECEIT AND 
SELF-DECEPTION IN HUMAN LIFE (2011). 
240 See Sunstein, supra note 237, at 1352–54 (stating that information that is “vivid and salient 
can have a larger impact on behavior than information that is statistical and abstract”); see 
also CASS R. SUNSTEIN, SIMPLER:  THE FUTURE OF GOVERNMENT (2013) (arguing for more 
government “nudges” such as product warnings and other disclosure rules rather than 
prohibitions or prescriptions). 
241 Id.; see also OREN BAR-GILL, SEDUCTION BY CONTRACT:  LAW, ECONOMICS, AND PSYCHOLOGY 
IN CONSUMER MARKETS (2012) (discussing the implications of behavioral economics for 
consumer contracts). 
242 See generally EDWARD L. BERNAYS, CRYSTALLIZING PUBLIC OPINION (1923); EDWARD 
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and cross-contextual conclusions about government as freedom of 
speech villain (or hero, for that matter).  And it points decidedly 
against the approach to freedom of speech problems that the Roberts 
Court took in the three scenarios outlined above. 
As we learn more about the precise nature of our cognitive weak-
nesses, courts will be confronted with starker choices about how—or 
whether—to address them within free speech doctrine.  Should gov-
ernment be given greater power to adopt regulations designed to 
correct for our cognitive flaws?  How much should the scientific evi-
dence weigh in the free speech calculus, before the traditional objec-
tion to “paternalism” kicks in?  And at what point, if ever, does the 
“marketplace of ideas” metaphor finally collapse under the weight of 
so much evidence that undermines its basic assumptions about ration-
al speakers and audiences, or “truth” as its residue? 
My point again is that the Court would be wise to avoid formalisms 
that will make it much harder for free speech doctrine to accommo-
date the emerging evidence about who we really are and how we really 
think.  It also needs to preserve breathing room for ways in which 
both of these things may change in the years ahead.243  Cheery, ro-
manticized accounts of who we wish we were, or who we used to be, 
will only make it harder for constitutional law to “stay real.” 
G.  Operationalizing the Non-Formalistic Approach – Two Helpful 
Illustrations 
Two elegant scholarly treatments of important free speech prob-
lems illustrate how courts might better tailor free speech analysis and 
theoretical justifications to doctrinal reality.  In the first, the writer 
argues for above-the-line treatment of “data.”  In the other, the writer 
urges caution about above-the-line treatment of expert knowledge or 
professional speech.  The shared features of the arguments, if not 
 
FORMATION OF MEN’S ATTITUDES (1965); EDWARD S. HERMAN & NOAM CHOMSKY, 
MANUFACTURING CONSENT:  THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE MASS MEDIA (2002); FRANK 
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243 This concern is not unique to free speech doctrine.  The modern Court’s stress on histor-
ical practices as a primary tether for constitutional interpretation, as well as its preference 
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ways in which saving room for innovation matters.  See Toni M. Massaro, Substantive Due 
Process, Black Swans, and Innovation, 3 UTAH L. REV. 987, 987–88, 990 (2011) (discussing 
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their specific proposed outcomes, illuminate how to analyze contem-
porary free speech problems like the introductory problems in a 
manner that is both descriptively accurate and normatively grounded 
but not rigidly formalistic. 
1.  “Big Data” as Speech 
An important free speech line-drawing debate is being played out 
now in scholarly works that address production, collection, and in-
terpretation of huge data sets.  Is this data speech?  If not, when is da-
ta protected speech and what level of protection does it enjoy?  Can 
we live with the effects of locating data—raw or refined—
presumptively in the same free speech territory as political expres-
sion?  Does the “big data” revolution, with its potential to radically al-
ter our notions of personal privacy, change the answer?  What are the 
doctrinal, theoretical, and practical consequences of the answers to 
all of these questions? 
Jane Bambauer makes a powerful case for presumptively treating 
data as above-the-line speech.244  Her article is an excellent vehicle for 
demonstrating how the existing free speech framework shapes the 
discussion, and is best understood as multi-factored and flexible ra-
ther than dichotomous and inflexible. 
Like all arguments for expanding free speech to embrace a new 
category, Bambauer invokes the normative claims that favor broader 
readings of speech protection.  In particular, she relies on the “think-
er-based” theory of freedom of expression advanced by Seana Valen-
tine Shiffrin,245 which sheds helpful light on the audience or future 
speaker aspect of First Amendment rules that protects expressive ac-
tivity.  For Bambauer, free speech is not just about the current speak-
er’s interests, but how one speaker’s data flow leads to another’s new 
idea. 
Tracking doctrine and influential analyses of doctrine, Bambauer 
then posits that where First Amendment coverage is ambiguous, gov-
ernment motives for suppressing it matter.246  Regulation that is de-
signed to interfere with knowledge offends her preferred thinker-
 
244 See Bambauer, supra note 122, at 105–06 (discussing why data should not be relegated to a 
lower form of protection in all cases). 
245 See Shiffrin, supra note 39, at 283–84, 303–04 (describing the “thinker-based” theory of 
freedom of expression). 
246 Bambauer, supra note 122, at 89–91. See also Elena Kagan, Private Speech, Public Purpose:  
The Role of Governmental Motive in First Amendment Doctrine, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 413, 414–15 
(1996), for an earlier important work on the importance of government purpose in free 
speech analysis. 
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based theory of the First Amendment; other regulation may not.  Se-
cond, Bambauer underscores doctrinal outcomes that best support 
her theory as well as her specific claim for expanded protection for 
data.  She carefully canvasses other speech that enjoys special protec-
tion, and shows why much data deserves similar treatment, despite 
concerns about invasions of individual privacy or other potential 
harms that unregulated data collection, disclosure, and use regula-
tions may cause.247 
Unlike less prudent arguments for expanded free speech protec-
tion, Bambauer adds a crucial third step to her free speech argument:  
she refuses to state the level of scrutiny that should apply to regulations of data 
flow because “the answer will depend on context.”248  She also notes that da-
ta above-the-line is subject to the further qualification that all such 
speech receives—for example, is it commercial speech?  Is it a matter 
of public or merely private concern?249  In other words, whether this 
“protected” speech is really protected in a significant way from regu-
lation depends. 
This is a wise caveat that leaves substantial play in the regulatory 
joints to accommodate context variable government interests in regu-
lating data.  Of course, it also leaves data (and regulators of data) in a 
bit of a haze:  data is above-the-line, but barely, and is not always pro-
tected.  But the weakness of the proposal is also its strength.  Bam-
bauer’s argument for above-the-line scrutiny combines order and 
flexibility.  She proposes a thumb on the free speech scale in data 
flow cases and makes a compelling case that data is presumptively ex-
pressive, not mere authorless “conduct.”  Yet she expressly notes that 
facts and context matter. 
Although Bambauer favors a normative theory that has the capaci-
ty to contain her pro-speech recommendations, she curbs her pro-
speech enthusiasm.  She does not dictate how the courts should treat 
the dizzying array of potential applications of free speech principles 
to all forms of data flow.  Instead, she carefully highlights the most 
important free speech questions and values at stake, then leaves the 
balancing to careful, case-by-case judicial consideration, while effec-
tively undermining reflexive arguments against her that would treat 
data collection as less-protected “conduct.”250 
Surely some will critique her article for failing to offer greater 
doctrinal or normative crispness to guide courts and restrain data 
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regulators.  Yet, for the reasons offered herein, Bambauer did exactly 
the right thing in sailing past the sirens calling her to the rock of 
“categorical protection!” or the whirlpool of “no protection!” 
Similar caution is warranted whenever one is advancing a new 
claim for above-the-line treatment of expression.  Again, the judicial 
capacity to intelligently umpire these disputes is untested, and the 
risk is always that courts will fall back onto old free speech bromides 
that work best in traditional contexts rather than carefully consider 
the context-sensitive nuances and potential harms of newly protected 
speech.  And again, courts rarely retreat:  speech that attains above-
the-line status tends to keep it forever. 
Bambauer’s “data as speech” problem makes clear the value of 
doctrinal incrementalism and the importance of preserving room for 
potentially colliding policy interests.  The most serious question 
about her proposal thus is not whether her incrementalism is norma-
tively or doctrinally sensible—it is both—but whether the current 
Court will display similar restraint and respect for nuance when it 
confronts the looming “big data” regulatory issues in future cases. 
2.  Expert, Disciplinary Knowledge as Speech 
A second, increasingly important line-drawing debate involves 
whether and when government regulation of the circulation of ex-
pert, disciplinary knowledge violates freedom of expression.  Here 
again, we are of two, contradictory minds. 
Free speech anxieties plainly are mobilized when the government 
regulates professional or expert speech on politically charged top-
ics—think of the controversy in California over prohibitions on ther-
apists treating minors with the “gay cure”251 or laws that require doc-
tors to deliver particular messages to patients seeking lawful 
abortions.252  Few people want a politically driven legislature to cap-
ture or control expert, professional speech in ways that distort disci-
plinary knowledge, however they define “distort”. 
Nevertheless, government regulation of professional or expert 
speech traditionally has more often been treated as a below-the-line 
problem, under which content-based distinctions, speaker-based reg-
ulation, and compelled speech happen frequently, without serious 
 
251 See S. 1172, 2011-2012 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2012), available at https://leginfo.legislature.
ca.gov/faces/billNavClient.xhtml?bill_id=201120120SB1172; Pickup v. Brown, 740 F.3d 
1208, 1215 (9th Cir. 2013). 
252 See Planned Parenthood Minnesota, North Dakota, South Dakota v. Rounds, 686 F.3d 
889, 892 (8th Cir. 2013); Post, supra note 183, at 948–49. 
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First Amendment consternation.  Moreover, few people want politi-
cally-driven, incompetent, or unscrupulous “quacks” to administer 
medical treatment or deliver professional advice based on idiosyn-
cratic or indefensible notions of best practices.  They expect govern-
ment to police “malpractice” and “fraud.” 
In his illuminating examination of this important area of freedom 
of expression, Robert Post defends the conventional approach to 
regulation of expert knowledge, which permits much greater gov-
ernment control of “professional speech” than would be allowed for 
speech by a professional, in a non-professional capacity.253  Post in-
vokes doctrine that allows such regulation, and relies upon a political 
theory of free speech that comports best with this outcome.  Specifi-
cally, he draws heavily on the public/private concern dichotomy of-
ten deployed in freedom of speech cases,254 and argues that the best 
normative account of elevated speech protection is that it covers 
speech that facilitates successful self-governance, which he then ar-
gues supports distinctions between professional and private expres-
sion.255 
Post’s argument for presumptive but not absolute government 
power to regulate expert knowledge is cautious, context-sensitive, and 
non-formalistic.  It respects doctrine and its normative underpin-
nings, but avoids close-ended declarations that would foreclose courts 
from making adjustments in situ. 
There is again a “thumb on the scale” here in favor of regulation, 
but with a theoretical premise that is sufficiently complex to capture 
an enduring complexity within freedom of speech:  government in-
terventions can advance knowledge, not merely interfere with it.  His 
approach therefore leaves room for courts to adjust their rulings ac-
cordingly. 
3.  Common Insights 
The Bambauer argument for expanding free speech coverage to 
include data flow, and the Post argument to restrain free speech con-
straints on production of expert knowledge, follow quite similar and 
sensible methodological steps.  These shared features show the com-
monalities that often bind superficially contradictory approaches to 
speech coverage problems. 
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Both Bambauer and Post begin with a subset of speech problems 
(with Bambauer, data; with Post, expert knowledge).256  Both work 
out from their conclusions to a doctrinal presumption that suits their 
favored outcomes (with Bambauer, protection of data flow from gov-
ernment interference; with Post, protection of expert knowledge 
from government interference).257 
Both worry about—though perhaps not to the same degree—the 
normative implications of blurring the lines between public and pri-
vate communications and between protected and unprotected com-
munications. 258  Both also worry about the obstacles to knowledge 
that government regulation of information may impose, but under-
stand that laissez-faire responses too may thwart knowledge.259 
Both anticipate practical limits on their doctrinal preferences 
(Bambauer, “context matters”; Post, “context matters”).260  Neither 
embraces free speech absolutism. 
Finally, both arguments, for all of their elegance, inevitably raise a 
question that is endemic to all non-absolutist approaches:  “[w]hy 
draw the protection line there, but not here?” 
This last objection is legitimate, but ultimately is not enough to 
justify a more absolutist approach.  Bambauer’s thinker-based ap-
proach to First Amendment boundary drawing in data flow cases like-
ly is not more useful than is Post’s political theory-based boundary 
drawing in expert knowledge cases, once one moves away from the 
specific cases both of them address.  Bambauer likely needs to more 
specifically define knowledge worth protecting, and Post likely needs 
to more specifically define public purposes worth pursuing, if they 
hope to assist judges in drawing future lines.  As I have explained, 
however, this is not a reason to reject either contribution.261  All viable 
constitutional arguments must work within a common law tradition, 
and thus must match the common law process itself—i.e. they should 
inch out, case by case, from past decisions and adapt to new exam-
ples. 
All viable free speech theories also beg important application 
questions.  The best of them blunt regulation and underscore the 
importance of liberty norms, even when speech is disturbing or dis-
ruptive.  Nevertheless, even the best of them cannot cover all of the 
 
256 See supra Part II.G.1–2. 
257 See supra text accompanying notes 245–47, 253–54. 
258 See supra text accompanying notes 244–47, 253–54. 
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existing First Amendment terrain and offer a bright-line test for 
where all future boundary lines should be drawn.  This is why we have 
theories, not one theory, that courts invoke as they traverse the vast 
and bumpy doctrinal terrain.  The theoretical “n” equals “more than 
two, but . . . finitely many.”262  Taken together, they remind us that 
freedom of speech is an essential feature of a liberal democracy and 
tends to promote a marketplace of ideas, protects speaker autonomy, 
and advances truth and knowledge. 
Bambauer and Post thus are on the right doctrinal track when 
they underscore how much the location of speech above-the-line mat-
ters, despite the many caveats to protection that still apply up there.  
They are also on the right theoretical track when they explain why 
holding (or pushing) the line matters, as a normative matter, in the 
areas they consider.  Line-drawing doubts remain, but such doubts 
are inescapable. 
Finally, they deal persuasively with the doctrine we have, rather 
than ignore it, and accept the mushiness of free speech principles 
within that case law.  Then, they wisely leave things open for future, 
contextual analysis.  This is how the best First Amendment arguments 
can and should proceed, even though we may disagree with the ulti-
mate success of a specific doctrinal or theoretical claim. 
Neither work is flawless.  For example, Post seeks to explain the 
line between protected professional speech and unprotected speech 
as an outgrowth of a theory of protected speech that aims primarily at 
protecting speech that communicates information necessary “to en-
lighten public decisionmaking in a democracy.”263  Yet as we have 
seen, there are at least two problems with his explanation.  First, we 
may not agree that this is the primary purpose of the First Amend-
ment.  Second, we may not agree that much government regulation 
of professional speech is consistent with this theory of what should be 
protected speech. 
Why aren’t most professional communications between a doctor 
and her patient important vehicles of information?  Patients use these 
communications to advance their personal interests—their health—
in ways that resemble how voters use political communications to 
their potential legislative representatives to advance their personal in-
terests—including, but not limited to, their health.  In both cases, the 
audience has a right to receive information.  Why does regulation of 
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the communication in one context merely facilitate “informed con-
sent” and not in the other? 
Post replies that we should worry about physician speech regula-
tion that “does not merely compromise the ability of individual 
members of the public to receive accurate information; [but] also 
undermines public trust that professional physician speech will re-
flect the expertise of the ‘medical community.’”264  He goes on to say 
that this “strips physician-patient communications of their unique au-
thority and dependability, and . . . jeopardizes the capacity of the 
medical profession to serve as a reservoir of expert knowledge that 
can reliably be communicated to the public through physician-
patient disclosures.”265 
These are all compelling justifications for regulating professional 
speech, but they are not unique.  Presumably many other private ac-
tors also are reservoirs of expert knowledge, including about health.  
Why should the American Medical Association or other professional 
organizations stand on higher ground than these other actors, and be 
more immune from government regulation (read:  compulsion) of 
their communications? 
Post’s analysis of the medical profession’s insulation from unduly 
partisan or distorted speech regulations makes perfect sense only if 
one agrees that this professional speech has uniquely powerful con-
sequences, and is governed by professional standards that may better 
protect patient health than government interference will do.  But the 
power of medical professionals’ speech cuts in competing directions:  
it justifies some governmental interference (to assure its integrity), 
and makes suspect other governmental interference (to assure its in-
tegrity).266  In neither case does the integrity of the expert advice turn 
on whether the physician is compelled to say (or not say) something 
scripted by the government. 
Nor is the matter resolved in either case by determining whether 
the government regulation requires a form of government “ventrilo-
quism,” as some commentators have argued.267  Many ostensibly pri-
vate actors are directed by government to speak according to quite 
precise government standards.  Private employers may not say many 
specific things without government consequences.  Recipients of gov-
ernment grants may be obliged to post notices with government-
drafted words.  Private newspapers cannot run ads that list “Male On-
 
264 Id. at 979. 
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ly” jobs.  Private mental health professionals whose specialty is cogni-
tive or “talk therapy” cannot dispense psychological advice that state 
regulatory bodies deem to be malpractice.  Issuers of securities must 
follow extremely precise and arguably paternalistic rules regarding 
disclosures about the risks of investing. 
We are all, in other words, vulnerable to becoming government 
sock puppets, in appropriate roles and circumstances. 
This is not only true when we are paid to channel government 
messages, in the more classic example of agreeing to engage in “gov-
ernment speech” in exchange for a government benefit.  It is also 
true in cases of direct regulation of our private speech, such as when 
we are selling products,268 delivering medical care, or engaging in a 
very wide range of speech activity that involves—implicitly or explicit-
ly—conveying information to other people who have a need to rely 
on the integrity of that information. 
Nor is the compelled speech problem a simple exercise of line 
drawing between commands and incentives, between controversial 
and non-controversial material, or between facts and opinion.  Gov-
ernment has many ways to influence our thinking short of direct 
prohibitions or even the softer tool of selective funding.  These mes-
sages typically are not content- or value-neutral ones.269 
As Lawrence Lessig wrote years ago, “the proscription of speech is 
just one of many means to the establishment of orthodoxy—indeed, 
perhaps the least effective way.”270  Government has extremely broad 
power to control its “own” information, data, and property.271  And, 
when government does speak, the Court has said the First Amend-
ment does not even apply.272  This is so even when the message is ex-
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plicitly ideological, and not merely a message designed to improve 
the integrity of discourse, promote knowledge, advance respect for 
prevailing expert or scientific knowledge, or expand the marketplace 
of ideas. 
The public school curriculum is a particularly vivid vehicle of pub-
lic values inculcation through “government speech.”  The availability 
of private school options mitigates the effect of public school curricu-
la on all students, but the messages conveyed by public schools still 
may influence the millions of students who attend them.  Even a 
home-schooling option does not mean the government has no power 
over educational content in these settings:  states constitutionally can 
require that basic educational standards are met. 
Other examples of government inculcation of thought abound, 
and the line between permissible government promotion of worthy 
ends and offensive, non-factual or paternalistic government coercion 
is often very cloudy.  Is it merely factual and non-coercive for gov-
ernment to require that tobacco products warn us about the health 
hazards of smoking?  Or is it spreading a normative message in ways 
that cross the First Amendment line?273  Should government be al-
lowed to require that menu labels inform us of the nutritional con-
tent of all items?  Or is this an incursion into private speech that 
treats patrons paternalistically?274  Even if it does, what does this 
speech have to do with public discourse?  Does that matter, as Post 
believes it does, to the baseline question of whether the speech de-
serves full First Amendment protection? 
One person’s government propaganda or paternalism is another’s 
sound government effort to promote sensible public policy by regu-
lating professionals, commercial actors and others—even if it means 
leading them (and us) by the nose to better private decisions.275  
Thinking about how to draw this often ideologically and scientifically 
contested line matters, especially in the contemporary moment of 
widespread, bipartisan distrust of government mandates and incen-
 
273 See Keighley, supra note 268, at 573 (concluding that graphic tobacco warnings cross the 
line). 
274 See Jennifer L. Pomeranz, Compelled Speech Under the Commercial Speech Doctrine:  The Case of 
Menu Label Laws, 12 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL’Y 159, 188–92 (2009) (arguing in favor of 
menu label laws). 
275 Of course, government can lead us by instructing us directly through its own “govern-
ment speech” rather than regulating private parties’ speech.  See Greene, supra note 267, 
at 2 (identifying three “monopoly, coercion, or ventriloquism” concerns with government 
speech, but defending strong government power to engage in government speech even 
when it involves great social costs if the government is one voice among many, is non-
coercive, and reveals its public source). 
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tives designed to promote individual welfare.  Government regulation 
that constrains full expressive autonomy inevitably will continue. 
The attractiveness of Post’s approach therefore is not that it solves 
all problems irrefutably:  it is that it helps in thinking about ways to 
proceed through this gnarly thicket, rather than denying that a thick-
et of options exists, and it tackles concrete illustrations with uncom-
mon doctrinal and theoretical rigor.  That Post’s account also in-
cludes leap-of-faith moments in which he assumes the value of some 
expression, in service of leap-of-faith, romantic theoretical assump-
tions about the value of freedom of speech more generally, is not a 
fatal flaw.  It is an inescapable feature of analysis that respects the 
messy First Amendment world we have, yet also embraces the hope it 
reflects. 
CONCLUSION 
The free speech paradox is this:  we are unwilling to pitch alto-
gether the First Amendment myths of our impressive autonomous 
thinking skills and political process engagement that drive so much 
of the doctrine—for what, pray tell, will we substitute for this rosy 
construction of liberal democracy?276  But we also are unlikely to ig-
nore it completely because of our commitment to this rosy construction. 
The First Amendment myth of the rational thinker, which the sci-
entific literature and much common sense undermine, compels us to 
take a closer look at the doctrine we have, the limits of our theories 
about it, and the fissures that both display.  Freedom of speech rheto-
ric and its mythology, more than any other constitutional rhetoric 
and mythology, remind us that everything we currently believe may 
be wrong.  Again, the crucial constitutional leaps of faith are that 
there is no such thing as a false idea, that the marketplace is the best 
proving ground for politically charged thought, that we can handle 
factual complexities, and that we will listen to speakers who strike us 
as disgusting, threatening, stupid, biased, lazy, bloviating, craven, or 
 
276 See Massaro & Stryker, supra note 233, at 439 (2012) (noting that “[i]t may well be . . . that 
reason is developed strategically,” but that nonetheless, democracy cannot “‘hold such a 
pessimistic view of the citizen and still believe in meaningful debate’” (quoting Leon 
Wieseltier, The Fear of Reason, NEW REPUBLIC, July 14, 2011, at 36)); see also Larissa Barnett 
Lidsky, Nobody’s Fools:  The Rational Audience as First Amendment Ideal, 2010 U. ILL. L. REV. 
799, 839 (2010) (recognizing the many problems with the rational audience model, yet 
concluding that “[t]o reject the possibility of a rational citizenry . . . is to reject the demo-
cratic ideal”); cf.  Richard Michael Fischl, The Question That Killed Critical Legal Studies, 17 
LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 779 (1992) (arguing that the question “what should we do instead?” 
is a powerful brake on some of the critical legal studies work that rigorously critiques ac-
cepted norms and standards in conventional legal thinking). 
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plumb crazy.  These heroic assumptions counsel many virtues, despite 
their obvious descriptive flaws.  The most important of these virtues is 
intellectual and judicial humility. 
Genuine intellectual and judicial humility, in turn, should mean 
rejecting free speech formalisms, one-theory chimeras, grand doctri-
nal syntheses, and the farthest reaches of free speech mythology and 
fantasies.  The Court can, and should, heed these cautions and recal-
ibrate its approach accordingly. 
A multi-factored, pragmatic and non-formalist approach to free-
dom of speech best describes the free speech doctrine we have, and is 
a better way to develop that doctrine going forward than is close-
ended formalism.  It also leaves the door open to consider the rapidly 
changing scientific scene that bears on individual autonomy and 
cognition. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
